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Cuba

Commentary on CIA, Counterrevolutionary Groups

PA0601140192 Havana Radio Havana Cuba in Spanish 1400 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Roberto Morejon commentary]

[Text] Those who defend the peculiar theory that ideologies are no longer being imposed around the world today should take note of Cuba's charges that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, the CIA, is playing a central role in furthering counterrevolutionary groups on the island.

One of the two big powers of the world has just disappeared amid confusion, and the other one, the United States, is getting ready to impose the ideology of capitalism on the world. That is the CIA's objective when it sponsors very small groups of Cuban citizens who carry out confrontational activities against the revolutionary Caribbean government in an attempt to gain favor with Washington. Even though it is a fact that those small counterrevolutionary groups have strong internal differences because of their lack of a social base, the CIA and some Western media magnify the activities in Cuba of those who back the U.S. blockade against the island and call for the return of capitalism.

The U.S. Government and the extreme right-wing of the counterrevolutionaries of Cuban origin who live in the United States want to impose their ideology, which is rejected by a majority of the more than 10 million Cubans. Those two forces encourage the 50 or so small groups that operate in Cuba. In total, the groups do not have more than 1,000 people, but the high pitch of their actions is spotlighted by the foreign media and several diplomats accredited in Havana who, thus, infringe upon the basic norms of their position.

The groups, which represent very few people, assert that they defend human rights, which are not violated here. The Western media unsuccessfully tries to present those people, who have made a career out of trying to push Cuba into the ways of capitalism, as naive activists. Cuban party leader Carlos Aldana recently stated that such groups have always tried to bring about the erosion of socialism from within. He added that, from the beginning, those groups had taken a despicable, antipatriotic, and miserable position and provided the United States with justification and excuses for its campaign against Cuba.

* New Opposition Group Described

92P40089A Paris LE MONDE in French 20 Dec 91 pp 1, 4

[Text] Three high-level state workers—an economist, an engineer, and a Ministry of the Interior employee—received us, with much precaution, in a small apartment in the Marianao suburb of Havana. Without naming or giving details as to their exact duties in the government, they invited us to this nocturnal meeting. "Not because we fear reprisals," says one, "but simply because we need secrecy in order to wage an effective struggle within the state apparatus and Communist Party."

They turned on the air conditioning full blast and closed the curtains as protection from the curiosity of neighbors who possibly work for the neighborhood Committee for the Defense of the Revolution. The presence of a VCR on a shelf and other goods which are difficult to find in Cuba bears witness to the social status of these dissidents, who have the luxury of producing their clandestine pamphlets on government computers and printers. What a contrast to human rights organizations forced to make do with an old typewriter and to beg for the use of photocopy machines in embassies!

"Castro is prepared to take us back to the 19th century in order to keep himself in power. We have been living for more than a year under a regime of restrictive measures called 'the special period in peacetime,' and since oil is no longer being delivered, the 'zero option' will soon be implemented. That means no more electricity and everyone to the countryside: the return to a subsistence economy. We find it unacceptable to have to choose between Fidel and death!" asserts one of our hosts, paraphrasing the official slogan "socialism or death!"

All three belong to an organization formed this year called the Marti Association of Opposition to the Regime (AMOR), a reference to Jose Marti, hero of the Cuban war of independence in the late 1800's. "We have clandestine cells in most ministries and even in the army," states the engineer.

"Some of our members belong to the Communist Party, others do not. Our work is based on giving out information, because we each have access to data which are considered state secrets and which are generally published in a falsified form."

Pamphlet No. 4, which is currently circulating in the cells, denounces "government incompetence in the face of current hardships" and its "recourse to lies and disinformation." "It is necessary to put an end to the myth of Fidel Castro and recall certain historic truths which have been censured." To illustrate their remarks, our hosts found several of the commander in chief's speeches made after he took power in January 1959, in which he was passionately committed to defending "freedom of the press" and "democratic principles."

"Fidel's strategy," the economist explains, "is to make people believe that the current crisis is caused by two external factors: the U.S. trade embargo and the collapse of the socialist bloc. He refrains from remembering that we were among the highest per capita producers in Latin America before 1959—it is true that there were many inequities and much misery—and that today we rank 12th or 13th. The embargo never truly worked because American products are found in dollar stores reserved for tourists and a few thousand privileged Cubans. The [current] disaster in fact is the result of mismanagement

by Cuba's leaders, who persist in their desire to adapt economic realities to political decisions. That worked so long as we were subsidized by the Soviets. As it was written in PRAVDA, if there is medicine in Cuba it is thanks to the generosity of the Soviet people."

Only Weapons Factories Operate

Our hosts consider "the ravings of a mad man" the counsel which the chief of state ("like Mao Zedong-a great man who stayed in power too long") gave in a lengthy speech before the Congress of Agricultural Workers at the end of November. "How dare he tell the people to eat peas instead of meat and grow vegetables in vacant lots? Cubans expect real solutions to their problems."

The economist is particularly concerned by the interruptions in oil deliveries and some raw materials which have brought about the closing of "several dozen large factories" and slowed production in most enterprises. He cites the case of Havana Plastics, one of Cuba's largest factories (800 workers), which "is operating at 20 percent capacity for lack of plastic." "Only weapons factories continue to operate at near normal capacity," he explains, "but if Moscow delivers only 2 or 3 million tons of oil in 1992, compared to 8 million this year and 13 million the year before, even this sector will be affected."

The lack of fuel and spare parts for machinery will affect the sugar cane harvest, which is already behind schedule and could be well below that of 1990-1991 (7.6 million tons and approximately 80 percent of hard currency earnings). Tobacco is encountering more serious problems because of its low quality and loss of several foreign markets.

An Inactive Nuclear Power Plant?

With regard to nickel, it is greatly valued for its good quality, but its production cost is too high. According to the economist, "the Soviets have invested almost 1 billion rubles in outdated, fuel-inefficient technology, with the result that with two factories and a third under construction, we produce little more than we did in the 1950's (40,000 tons compared to 35,000). The participation of a Canadian investor in the third factory may improve productivity but it will not do much for us because we are negotiating from a weak position."

What is even more serious is that the highly controversial nuclear power plant built by the Soviets (90 percent of the work is finished and preliminary tests are planned for the beginning of 1992) may never be put into operation, in spite of the colossal sums invested. "At best, we will have two 407-megawatt reactors instead of four 440-megawatt reactors," the economist explains. "But the Soviet Union will undoubtedly not be able to supply us the 14 tons of enriched uranium we will need per year for each reactor nor the 40 tons of fuel initially needed per reactor." The cadres of AMOR hoped that the fourth Congress of the Cuban Communist Party, held in October, would make it possible to initiate the necessary changes to adapt to the new political and economic realities. "When the delegates were appointed we realized that nothing would come of it," the Interior Ministry employee explains. "Out of 1,766 delegates, 1,000 were selected by the government and the others were chosen for their docility. From now on we will have to work on another level; working particularly with human rights organizations, the new independent union established at the end of September, and with many groups which have formed on the left despite repression."

The leaders of the two principal human rights organizations, Elizardo Sanchez and Gustavo Arcos, have already let it be known that they are open to dialogue with "the country's civilian and military leaders, because they will have a fundamental role in facilitating change and Fidel Castro's departure."

Commentary on Church, Government Relations

PA0601154492 Havana Radio Havana Cuba in Spanish 0100 GMT 3 Jan 92

[Beatriz Padron commentary]

[Text] In agreement with the Cuban revolution's policy of encouraging the necessary trust among all groups of society, Cuban Christians are equally loyal to their faith and to their duties as citizens, under equal conditions and with a responsibility similar to other groups.

The revolution's willingness to correct mistakes, a willingness that, far from dividing, unites everyone in the effort to (?carry out) joint work, has contributed to that to a large extent. The Cuban Ecumenical Council has also played a significant role in the social awakening process of Cuban Christians. The Council oversees the island's active protestants and is the mechanism that has facilitated the frequent exchange of views between believers and the government.

As a result of steps taken by both sides, governmental party officials have thus far held an easy dialogue with the Cuban Ecumenical Council, particularly at a recent meeting held in Havana on the occasion of the pastoral meeting for the support of the Cuban people. Carlos Aldana, member of the Communist Party of Cuba [PCC], referred to the spirit of unity that inspires the island's political process and to the leadership's desire to invite both religious and nonreligious people to use their experiences to enrich the work of the revolution.

[Begin Aldana recording] I have always believed that the best way to understand the imperfections of revolutionary work is to look at them in light of the imperfections of the church, which always alludes to man and his experience. Such imperfections are similar to those of our society and revolutionary effort, but I am not inviting you to stop prayer so that imperfections can be corrected. One of you said here, and I think he said it very well, that God has given us the ways and means to solve various problems in life, and that we should not expect Him to do the things He has empowered us to do. Without ceasing to pray, we should strive to resolve the still pending problems.

Let us make every effort to illuminate the minds of those who have not yet measured up to the times. Let us also try to discern when they are wrongly interpreting the mistakes of some church representatives or regular members, mistakes unfairly and arbitrarily generalized and used as an excuse not to take a proper stand toward the new requirements and policy. [end recording]

The 2 April meeting between Cuban President Fidel Castro and leaders of the country's leading Evangelical churches was an opportunity to make a critical analysis of what has been done in this field. This meeting began a process that was culminated at the Fourth PCC Congress. The October 1991 meeting of the highest Cuban political organization agreed to eliminate from its reglations any and all stipulations barring party membership for religious revolutionaries.

Here is Eunice Santana, president of the World Church Council, who commented on the amendment when she visited Cuba in December.

[Begin Santana recording] It is highly commendable to recognize the fact that being a Christian does not necessarily block our senses and prevent us from understanding how society functions or from participating in the process of our own people. I think the amendment agrees with what was said in the seventies, that it is not incompatible to be a Christian and a revolutionary. The only hope for the impoverished and needy people is here, in the plan for life that has been constructed and continues to be perfected in Cuba. [end recording]

Because the immediate task of the revolutionaries and the churches is to make known the concern over life in the country, there have been many expressions of support from evangelical Christians for the Cuban political and social plan, and for the Cuban revolution's independence and principles of national sovereignty. Here is Reverend Carlos Kant, secretary general of the Cuban Reformed Presbyterian Church.

[Begin Kant recording] The U.S. blockade and embargo against Cuba, the criminal embargo that does not even allow Cuba to trade with third countries, worsens our people's situation. We cannot agree with that action, which has been condemned by history and by the continent. The embargo is a true diabolical action. We would like the brethren and comrades who come from elsewhere to help us in the blockade problem. The maturity of the Cuban church and the political and human maturity of our people are one of our greatest treasures. [end recording]

Christians and Marxists in Cuba agree on many points, the most prominent of which is the social justice and independence policy that the Cuban revolution has established in its more than three decades of existence. This is supported by the Cuban Evangelical community's willingness to continue working on the same plan of unity of the people, as proof that love of God and love of the homeland do not contradict each other.

Police Uncover, Arrest Coffee Pilfering Ring

FL0701031792 Havana Radio Rebelde Network in Spanish 0000 GMT 7 Dec 92

[Interview with Lieutenant Ramon de Quesada and Major Manuel Andivias of the National Revolutionary Police by mobile unit correspondent Heidi Gonzalez Cabreras, place not given—live]

[Text] [Gonzalez] Lieutenant Ramon de Quesada will provide further details on the police operation that uncovered and arrested this morning, at 0900, a group of six criminals who stole and sold coffee pilfered from the Pilon Coffee Roasting Plant. Lieutenant, could you explain to our listeners what steps were taken after the roasting plant operation was conducted to find the house of the ringleader [maceta]?

[Quesada] We gathered a few witnesses at the roasting plant and inquired around the site, as well as with neighbors, who stated that certain nearby neighbors were engaged in this type of activity. Therefore, we immediately proceeded to make some inquires in the area and got the names and aliases of some of these people. Next, we located the house of the alleged ringleader, where we arrived with a search warrant and found in a room approximately 500 coffee bags improperly packed. At the time, these people were repacking approximately 200 empty bags of coffee. Immediately, we conducted a body search of each individual and found great amounts of money in many of them. We arrested them immediately and took them to the 320 Puentes Grandes territorial unit where the individuals are being questioned as required by the significance of the act.

[Gonzalez] Could you tell me more about these citizens, these individuals? Do they have police records?

[Quesada] All the individuals are well-known criminals. Many of them have been tried for drug trafficking, strong armed robbery, and fraud. They are repeat offenders of this type of crime and employ coercion and bullying.

[Gonzalez] Lieutenant, during the course of the investigation, were you able to find out how they resold the bags of coffee?

[Quesada] Once the coffee was repacked, even in plastic bags, it was sold at approximately 35 pesos a bag.

[Gonzalez] As a result of the investigation still underway, is it possible to know if some worker from the roasting plant itself could be implicated? They had to have a way to get the coffee out.

[Quesada] Right now, in the interrogations being conducted, facts are coming out implicating plant workers who are in collusion with these criminals and worked together. The case is being thoroughly investigated in order to prosecute these individuals with all the force of the law that the current circumstances require, if we keep in mind that the nation is experiencing a special period in which we are almost at war.

[Gonzalez] Yes, consumer products become more essential. Major Manuel Andivias, could I have some final words?

[Andivias] Yes, I only wanted to add that with the Unified Vigilance and Protection System that has been implemented in the country, we are sure all the individuals will be put in the hands of the courts and that you will be able to relay that information to our people.

[Gonzalez] It has really been a great pleasure for me. We are out of time. We appreciate our listeners attention and time. Once again, I want to congratulate you and the members of your unit and all those who represent us so well.

State Committee Issues Decree on Work Days

FL0701033092 Havana Tele Rebelde and Cuba Vision Networks in Spanish 0100 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Text] The State Committee for Labor and Social Security has issued 1991 Resolution No. 19 which establishes the work schedule for Saturdays in 1992 for those centers and activities that were not affected by the suspension of Saturdays as a work day and that are operating on a full-time work day schedule on alternate Saturdays.

Those centers will work the following Saturdays:

January—11, 25
February—8, 22
March—7, 21
April—4, 18
May—2, 16, 30
June—13, 27
July—11
August—1, 15, 29
September—12, 26
October—17, 31
November—14, 28
December—12, 26

Sugarcane harvest work and activities; other livestock-agricultural and essential construction activities; continuous production industries; urgent work of the domestic economy-port-transportation network; transportation services; hospitals; pharmacies; gas stations on duty; mortuaries and cementaries are not included in this system. Neither are hotels; inns; communication centers; radio and television transmissions; recreation centers and tourist attractions; milk collection and distribution; other basic public services; fishing activities; and other activities authorized by law. Full-time work days will also be worked on alternate Saturdays in work centers that provide services to the population and which have not had Saturday suspended as a work day.

The following are the Saturdays that will be work days for those centers:
January—4, 18
February—1, 15, 29
March—14, 28
April—11, 25
May—9, 23
June—6, 20
July—4, 18
August—8, 22
September—5, 19
October—3, 24
November—7, 21
December—5, 19.

Havana Stresses Importance of Joint Enterprises

FL0601232092 Havana Radio Reloj Network in Spanish 2039 GMT 6 Jan 92

[Text] Unquestionably, one of the most discussed subjects in the country today is the creation of joint enterprises with foreign companies, the legal framework of which dates back to 1982 but has only recently intensified. In the midst of the current complex time in which Cuba is being subjected to a double embargo, the island is forced to survive and develop. Its existence as a nation depends on this. These circumstances force the nation to seek partners interested in developing its human and material resources. Since then, and within this context, Decree Law No. 50, regarding association with foreign capital, has become more crucial. Its implementation is the result of a realistic decision.

Cuba is seeking capital, markets, technology, and experience through the creation of these joint enterprises while offering the use of its idle production capabilities and other opportunities. For example, over the past three decades the revolution has invested in the industry sector 21 billion pesos and this, unquestionably, demonstrates a diversification of the economy.

Potential associates keep in mind the social stability of the country, the recovery of capital in a few years, the triplication of the investment over a 10-year period, the automatic repatriation of dividends, and the elimination of certain taxes. One-hundred-and-fifty joint enterprise projects from approximately 20 countries are currently under consideration and approximately 60 have already been signed agreements.

New National Radio Newscast Begins 6 Jan

FL0701032592 Havana Tele Rebelde and Cuba Vision Networks in Spanish 0100 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Text] A national radio newscast was broadcast this afternoon at 1300. Fifty-one stations linked together to broadcast 30 minutes of the most important news of Cuba and the world.

[Begin recording] [Pedro Rosas] This national radio newscast broadcast for the first time today, hopes to fill many gaps in radio and television programing and the printed press in a way that the people do not lack the information they need. Therefore, this is a radio news effort made by the entire radio system. It is true that the cast sits at Radio Rebelde but it is also true that this news

effort is made by the entire system because all provincial and municipal transmitters of the country will be linked through this program.

[Unidentified correspondent] Do you think that a half an hour is enough time to inform the people of all the things happening in the country and the world?

[Pedro Rosas] During the first broadcast made today, 50 reports were presented; 50 reports, headlines, correspondent reports, domestic reports, reports from various provinces, several interviews and items by reporters. Time is not a limiting factor if you know how to take advantage of it to report within the allocated time. [end recording]

Electricity Plan Exceeded in First 5 Days

FL0601211792 Havana Radio Rebelde Network in Spanish 1800 GMT 6 Jan 92

[Interview with Engineer Jorge Carballo, director of the National Electric Load Bureau, by Carlos Santana Ojeda, date and place not given—live or recorded]

[Text] [Santana] How has the national generation of electricity behaved with respect to the plan that was drawn up?

[Carballo] We can say that during the first two days—that is, 2 and 3 January—electricity generation was 1 percent below the plan; that is, the plan was 99-percent fulfilled. In the case of the two nonworking days, 4 and 5 January, and especially on 4 January, there was a slight increase with respect to the plan because of the fact that the plan is lower for those days since they are nonworking days.

[Santana] Has any province exceeded its assigned consumption?

[Carballo] Yes. In the specific case of the working days, and even on Saturday, some provinces exceeded their plans, and each province that is in this situation has taken a set of measures aimed at reducing consumption. This is the case of Las Tunas, Santiago de Cuba, and Camaguey, and during some hours of the day there have been outages in the electrical service to the populace. We think that in general, a number of work places which were not producing during last week will begin production over the course of this week, so this will necessarily be the defining week for controlling electricity usage by each of the provinces.

Inter-Caribbean Affairs

Dominican Minister on Cuban Membership in CTO

FL0601235792 Bridgetown CANA in English 2137 GMT 6 Jan 92

[Text] Roseau, Dominica, Jan 6, CANA—The Caribbean Tourism Organisation (CTO) should prepare for the time when Cuba will become a member of the grouping of national tourism organisations, CTO Chairman Charles Maynard has said. However, Maynard who is Dominica's Tourism Minister does not expect Cuba to gain acceptance to the tourism grouping until it adheres to the requirements laid down by Caribbean Community (Caricom) heads "to formally and publicly recognise Grenada."

"But having said that I think it must be acknowledged and it must be seen that looking down the road we have to prepare ourselves for the day that Cuba is going to be a part of the CTO," Maynard explained.

Cuba's communist government has sought membership in the 29-country CTO but the 13-member English-speaking Caricom grouping's official position is that acceptance rests with the recognition of the Grenada Government. Some countries like Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago do not object to Cuba's membership but Caricom operates on the basis of unanimity. Also, United States territories which are CTO members are unlikely to support Cuba's membership against the U.S. trade and travel embargo on Havana.

Maynard does not see Cuba's strides in tourism as a threat to the rest of the region since "we must recognise that Cuba itself has a lot of work to do on its infrastructure, on its personnel, and that sort of thing." He anticipates that once the Grenada recognition hurdle is overcome, the CTO will work together with the Cubans "because they are of course part of this hemisphere."

Cayman Islands

Government 'May Be Forced To Return' Refugees

FL0601134392 Bridgetown CANA in English 2017 GMT 4 Jan 92

[Text] George Town, Grand Cayman, Cayman Islands, Jan 4, CANA - The government of the Cayman Islands, a British colony, may be forced to return some of the 51 Cuban refugees it is currently housing if the United States does not approve their applications to enter that country soon, according to Administrative Secretary Lemuel Hurlston.

Hurlston said some of the refugees have been in the Cayman Islands more than nine months waiting on their paperwork from the United States to allow them to enter that country. That has caused a strain on the limited budget and resources of the Cayman Islands said, Hurlston.

"If efforts to get them into the United States fail, we will have no alternative but to consider involuntary deportation back to Cuba," said Hurlston.

The territory has no provision for granting refugees status to live and work in the islands. However, Hurlston pointed out, deportation has never happened before in dealing with refugees. All previous Cuban refugees to the Cayman Islands have been accepted in the United States.

The budget for handling refugees is just about exhausted, admitted Hurlston. In the past the Cayman Islands has never had more than a few Cuban refugees at any one time, he said. Of the current group of 51, sixteen have been here since March of 1991.

There are only two government houses available for all the refugees and the food budget has to be stretched to accommodate all the refugees, including babies and children. The Cubans now cook just one meal a day and rely on private donations for a large portion of their food and clothing.

While Hurlston conceded that efforts to get the current group of refugees into the United States are a bit slower than normal, "there is no time frame for this," he said.

He did not put the blame on either the United States or Cayman authorities, saying "this is a bureaucratic procedure."

"We are in constant communication with United States authorities and efforts continue to find ways of legal entry for the refugees," he reported.

Hurlston also declined comment on why three Cuban refugees are still interned in the territorial prison while the remainder are free, awaiting their paperwork approval.

Since 1989, more than 100 Cubans have escaped by boat from their homeland to the Cayman Islands, located about 180 miles off the south coast of Cuba. Prior to March of last year, all the refugees had been processed on to the United States in a minimal amount of time, usually around six weeks.

In the current group of Cubans, most said they have relatives already in Miami who can give them assistance once they get to the United States.

Hurlston said he is working on a plan to have the Cubans sent on to the United States into the care of their relatives while their paperwork is processed.

The Cubans now in the Cayman Islands spoke of severe economic and political conditions in Cuba. One man, who identified himself only as Vincent to protect relatives still living in Cuba, said he was captain of a fishing vessel for 20 years, but was not allowed to keep any of the fish he caught for himself.

"Everything is for the government, everything is for (President Fidel) Castro," said Vincent. He said the common people like himself received only 2.2 kilograms (5 pounds) of rice per month and a dozen eggs every two weeks. Top government and party officials get a lot more, he complained. Beer, he said, is not rationed so much. "I guess they want to get you drunk so you forget about eating," he remarked.

Haiti

Provisional Government's Mandate Expires 8 Jan

FL0601211892 Port-au-Prince Radio Soleil Network in Creole 1200 GMT 6 Jan 92

[Text] Today is 6 January and a new week has begun. It is a week of expectancy for all who are concerned with politics in Haiti. In two days, on 8 January, the Parliament will be faced with a situation that will force it to make a decision because the provisional government's mandate will expire on that date.

Will the legislative chamber extend the mandate of the provisional government as requested by Prime Minister Jean-Jacques Honorat so elections can be held or will it be forced to choose a prime minister, which is the first step toward the deposed president's return to power? These are the questions the man on the street is concerned with at this time. An answer should be forthcoming on 8 January. There might be other surprises—for instance—the resignation of the Senate president.

Negotiations continue. The personalities whose names are listed as potential prime ministers left the country over the weekend in order to meet with President Aristide and Augusto Ramirez Ocampo in Venezuela. According to the latest information that we have received, none of the designated leaders left the country for any other known reason. The Haitian delegation, which went to Venezuela at the end of December to meet with Father Aristide, published a memorandum providing explanations of this meeting.

Senate, Chamber Presidents Issue Communique

FL0601220392 Port-au-Prince Radio Nationale in French 2010 GMT 6 Jan 92

[Joint communique issued by the Dejean Belizaire, president of the Senate; and Pierre Duly Brutus, president of the Chamber of Deputies in Port-au-Prince on 6 January]

[Text] Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. The Republic of Haiti. The offices of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies inform all Haitian citizens and public opinion for whatever purpose it may serve that:

1. Under Article 149 of the Constitution, no executive power vacuum is foreseeable for 8 January.

2. According to Article 149 of the Constitution, 8 January coincides with the end of the maximum time limit of 90 days during which elections should be held throughout the national territory if the circumstances allowed so.

However, the mandate of Joseph Nerette, which began on 8 October 1991, will reach an end after formalities for transfer of power.

3. The dedicated parliamentary committee is working without respite with the executive power and the concerned interlocutors in order not only to alleviate the effects of the embargo but also to find a final and appropriate solution to this crisis.

[Signed] Dejean Belizaire, president of the Senate; and Pierre Duly Brutus, president of the Chamber of Deputies on 6 January

Commission Travels To Venezuela To See Aristide

PA0601235692 Paris AFP in Spanish 2240 GMT 6 Jan 92

[Text] Port-au-Prince, Jan 6 (AFP)—Well-informed sources have reported that an important Haitian parliamentary commission travelled to Caracas on the afternoon of 6 January to meet with toppled President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who is in exile in Venezuela.

The commission, which will make a stopover in the Dominican Republic, will discuss the appointment of a new prime minister with Aristide. The OAS considers the selection of a new prime minister to be the first phase required to reach a negotiated solution to the serious political crisis that began with 30 September military coup d'etat.

The commission is formed by Senate President Dejean Belizaire; Duly Brutus, vice-president of the Chamber of Deputies [title as received]; Senator Thomas Eddy Dupiton; and Deputy Joseph-Rindhal Pierre Canel. The last two officials are members of the National Front for Change and Democracy (a populist left-wing organization), the political coalition that backed Aristide in the December 1990 general elections.

The group is accompanied by the Canadian Laurent Paul Tardif, who is the OAS representative in Haiti, and the secretary of the Senate [name not given]. The commission will meet with former Colombian Foreign Minister Augusto Ramirez Ocampo, who is the OAS mediator in the Haitian crisis, and with Venezuelan leaders.

Four other political personalities, including Port-Au-Prince Mayor Evans Paul, travelled to Caracas with the commission.

Rene Theodore, a moderate communist and the president of the National Reconstruction Movement, has often been mentioned as a possible candidate for the post of prime minister. Theodore opposes Artistide. The movement that Theodore represents is a coalition of nationalist leftists; it includes many people who are not Marxists.

Aristide has already rejected the candidacy of the centrist Marc Bazin, who is the president of the Movement for the Establishment of Democracy in Haiti. According to informed sources, in principle, Aristide agrees to Theodore's candidacy.

Demonstration Against Aristide Planned for 7 Jan

FL0601225192 Port-au-Prince Radio Nationale in Creole 1400 GMT 6 Jan 92

[Excerpts] Daniel Narcisse, president of the Federative Party of the Liaison of Democratic Forces has called a massive demonstration for tomorrow, 7 January, in order to protest further negotiations favoring the return of Aristide to the country and to protest the choice of a new prime minister.

[Begin Narcisse recording] I would like to greet every Haitian listening to me right now. I also send my wishes for the New Year to the entire population. The reason I am here today is to announce a demonstration that we are staging on 7 January, starting at 0600. [passage omitted].

The reason for the demonstration is because of the endless negotiations on the return of Aristide. We think that the situation is now very distracting because we notice that a prime minister is suggested every week. Those prime ministers are chosen by Aristide. We think that there is a real plot brewing in the sense that several deputies and senators in the Parliament are into crooked dealings in order to propose a prime minister that Aristide has asked them to propose.

We strongly protest this situation and that is why we are staging a demonstration in order to ask the deputies and senators involved in these crooked dealings to stop doing so, to respect the law and the Constitution. The Constitution does not provide for these deputies and senators to negotiate anything. Only the executive has the power to negotiate. The Chamber can ratify something, once the executive submits it to the Chamber. Therefore, the Chamber cannot take the role of the executive and negotiate in order to choose a prime minister. We note that the Parliament first suggested Victor Benoit as a prime minister; then it was Rene Theodore. We are saying that such a thing must stop. That is one of the reasons for us to march on 7 January so that the Chamber keeps within its bounds.

Second, the demonstration is important because we want once and for all that the chapter concerning the return of Aristide is definitely closed. We can no longer live in an uncertain situation about the return or non return. Since 30 September, it has been clearly established that Aristide lost his power because he violated the Constitution, arbitrarily arrested numerous people, embezzled funds, and did so many other sordid things in this country that he can no longer remain president of Haiti. He is not the president of Haiti since he left after a justified coup. It is out of the question for Aristide to return and for anyone to negotiate state matters with Aristide. Aristide is not the president of Haiti and cannot choose a prime minister. If Aristide can choose a prime minister while he is in Venezuela, he can also have the right to sign any agreements concerning Haiti. It is a serious liability that the parliament, such an important institution in the country is still maintaining relations with Aristide, when he could sign any agreement without the approval of the executive.

The demonstration is also against the extension of the embargo on Haiti. We want the embargo to be lifted. We are asking everyone, all political parties, all patriots, no matter what his political persuasion, to rally with us so that on 7 January, in front of the Colombus Wharf at 1000 so we may stage a huge demonstration before the parliament in order to support the warranted deputies and senators, those who are defending the non return of Aristide to Haiti and that he cannot choose a prime minister for Haiti. We are asking everyone to be there at 1000 in order to demonstrate in peace and in discipline.

This is Daniel Narcisse, president of the Federative Party of Liaison of the Democratic Forces, speaking on behalf of all the compatriots taking part in organizing the demonstration with us and on behalf of the party as well. [end recording]

Delegation Seeks Cap-Haitien Mayor Reinstatement

FL0601212092 Port-au-Prince Radio Soleil Network in Creole 1200 GMT 6 Jan 92

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Within the scope of the visits that several Port-au-Prince personalities have made to Cap-Haitien, a delegation made up of Fritz Buissereth, head of the cabinet at the Ministry of Interior and National Defense; and Francis Gracia, director of political affairs and human rights at the same ministry arrived in Cap-Haitien on Monday, 30 December at 0900. The objective of the delegation was to meet with several sectors of the community in Cap-Haitien in order to reinstate the premier mayor of Cap-Haitien, Jacquelin Eugene who has been in hiding since the 29-30 September events that overthrew President Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

According to Mr. Buissereth, Mayor Jacquelin Eugene has asked the officials of his party, the National Reconstruction Movement [headed by Rene Theodore], to initiate steps with the concerned authorities so there is adequate security for his return to city hall. [passage omitted]

Jamaica

Prime Minister Manley Addresses Nation 5 Jan

FL0601141692 Bridgetown CANA in English 1949 GMT 5 Jan 92

[By Paget Defreitas]

[Text] Kingston, Jamaica, Jan 5, CANA—Prime Minister Michael Manley on Sunday night ruled out general elections in Jamaica before they are constitutionally due in 1994, saying he needed the time for his economic liberalisation policies to work.

In a remarks prepared for broadcast address to the nation, Manley conceded that the road towards a genuine market economy was painful for most Jamaicans, but argued that the country had no option but to see it through.

"Make no mistake about it—what we are doing will not be turned back, it cannot be turned back. It is irreversible," Manley said. However, the programme would obviously take time to bear fruits. Added the prime minister: "That is why people who talk about an election before 1994 are jokers. They don't even know the time of day and you can safely ignore them."

Manley's Sunday night's broadcast, following his New Year's day cabinet shake-up, contained nothing fundamentally new in economic policy, but it was important for those who entertained doubts that a new cabinet would signal a change in direction.

The radio and television broadcast—another of which is planned for next Sunday—was modelled off the kind of "fire-side chats" favoured by American presidents and part of Manley's efforts to shore up the flagging fortunes of his People's National Party (PNP).

"I have a new team in place, but I must tell (you) that both the members of the former team and the new team are completely united in the determination to see this thing trough," he said.

The Manley government has freed prices, removed exchange controls and import restrictions as well as divested state-owned companies.

The value of the Jamaica dollar has fallen, inflation has rocketed and interest rates have climbed steeply. Tight demand management has pushed interest rates to unprecedented heights and many economists here have warned that this could stifle the economy. But Manley indicated that there would be no early easing of the pressure as the government struggles with a U.S. 4 billion dollars foreign debt and the competing interests of maintaining fiscal discipline and encouraging growth.

In a bid to tackle inflation and to take some of the pressure off the Jamaican dollar, Manley said that the government would continue its aggressive control of public sector spending. The public sector deficit, running at 2.5 per cent of GDP this fiscal year, will be slashed to half a percentage point in the new fiscal year, he said. The Central Bank will also maintain a tight credit policy to sop up liquidity in the financial system, the prime minister reiterated.

Said Manley: "This will mean that high interest rates will continue. These measures are absolutely essential if we are to halt inflation and create the stable, predicatble, economic environment which will encourage investment and growth."

Manley say that maintaining a grip on credit to pull back inflation—in region of 60 per cent in 1991—was an issue on which the government "will not compromise".

Group To Analyze Government

FL0601161192 Bridgetown CANA in English 1507 GMT 6 Jan 92

[By Garfield Myers]

[Text] Kingston, Jamaica, Jan 6, CANA—A group of nine "experts" have been mandated to analyse the Jamaican Government and its departments and make recommendations aimed at reshaping it as "enabler, co-ordinator, developer of human resources and guardian of social justice and human welfare."

The group of academicians, and private and public sector executives named by Prime Minister Michael Manley during a nation-wide television and radio broadcast Sunday night, will be headed by Professor Rex Nettleford pro vice chancellor of the University of the West Indies (UWI).

It includes Sir Alister Mcintyre, vice chancellor of the UWI; Professor Edwin Jones, dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, UWI; G. Arthur Brown, governor of the Bank of Jamaica (Central Bank); Dr. Marshall Hall, chief executive of the Banana Producers Association; Keith Panton, chief executive, Alcan Jamaica; O.K. Melhado, vice president, Desnoes and Geddes Limited; Louis Lindsay, Department of Government, UWI and Dawn Ritch, advertising, marketing and public relations consultant.

Manley said the group which will make its report to him by March 31 will "carry out a wide ranging analysis of our government and its departments, our statutory corporations and similar bodies, even our commodity boards.

"They will be supported by resource people drawn from our senior civil service and management consultants. They will invite comment and analysis from the private sector, the trade unions, the professional bodies and the public".

Manley said the experts would not be able to give a detailed blueprint in the time allotted but would make sure that "our efforts at restructuring are pointed in the right direction".

Giving the rationale for the group's appoinment, the prime minister said that government and its structures were set up during colonialism and in the transition to independence. "We are now sufficiently well on the road to a genuine market economy to carry out a complete re-examination of the question: what is our government for, what do we expect of it, what is it there to do?"

Manley noted that work had already started on reorganising the civil service and restructuring ministries towards a more cost effective government. Steps were also in place to reduce bureacratic red tape in order to facilitate exports and investment "... We are working at our end to make government a help rather than a hindrance as we push for production," he said.

The latest appointments also come in the wake of what is being described here as a crisis in government following two major scandals in 1991. Former Deputy Prime Minister and finance Minister P.J. Patterson and former Mining and Energy Minister Horace Clarke both lost their jobs in recent weeks for their part in granting a 29.5 million dollar (one Ja dollar about 5 U.S. cents) tax waiver to Shell Co. W.I. Ltd. The controversy also led to a slimming of the cabinet with several ministers, junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries being dropped.

Early last year the Manley administration was also rocked with what has become known as "the furniture scandal" involving the misappropriation of 1.5 million dollars in public funds intended for the furnishing of houses occupied by government officials including ministers.

In addition, polls conducted by the highly respected UWI Political Scientist Professor Carl Stone have shown a dramatic loss of faith in public administration generally, even as the ruling Peoples National Party has fallen eleven percentage points behind the opposition Jamaica Labour Party in voter popularity

Former Ministers Ordered To Work for Party

FL0601135792 Bridgetown CANA in English 2042 GMT 4 Jan 92

[By Paget Defreitas]

[Text] Kingston, Jamaica, Jan 4, CANA—With the popularity of his People's National Party (PNP) dwindling and elections two years away, Prime Minister Michael Manley has not only trimmed the size of his government but ordered fired ministers to go sell government policies to the people.

Manley Friday night followed up his New Year's day cabinet shuffle, which saw the number of ministers cut by three to 15, by dropping three ministers of state and five parliamentary secretaries to reduce the overall size of the government from 39 to 28.

But clearly with an eye on the PNP's electoral fortunes in 1994, Manley has created a new party post of national organiser and sent Manley Bowen, the former parliamentary secretary in the Public Service and Information Ministry, to fill the slot.

He is expected to bolster the work of party chairman and head of the PNP Campaign Committee, P.J. Patterson, the former finance minister forced out of the government by the scandal over the granting of a duty waiver to the local branch of Shell Oil Company on the importation of unleaded gasolene.

All recent opinion polls here have shown the PNP badly trailing Edward Seaga's opposition Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) as popular support for the government has slumped not only from the series of scandals but also because of a radical and painful programme of liberalisation and deregulation that Manley has been pushing through since 1989.

In addition to Patterson and Bowen, three other former government members have been sent to do party work—Carl Marshall, Sam Lawrence, Binnard Barret and Violet Neilson.

Marshall had been minister of state in the National Security Ministry while the others were all parliamentary secretaries in various ministries.

They were told by Manley to now "focus their attention on the need for greater and increased representational activities and to strengthen the linkage between the government and the people". The role of those sent back to their constituencies, Manley said in a statement, was important "in light of the bold economic reform measures now being implemented".

These measures have included the elimination of all subsidies, the opening of the market to competition, the divestment of state companies and the removal of exchange controls. But with Jamaica's critical shortage of foreign exchange the value of the local dollar has plummeted, inflation has been rampant and critics say interest rate are stifling because of demand management policies.

Manley is to make a broadcast Sunday night on economic matters but he has already signalled that there will be no fundamental change in policy. In a shake-up of the second rung of the government, there were two promotions to minister of state, one of whom was among the two new faces in the team.

Roger Clarke, who entered Parliament only last year in a by-election, was brought to the front benches as a minister of state for agriculture.

The other newcomer was A.J. Nicholson, named parliamentary secretary in the Ministry of Education and Culture.

Marjorie Taylor, parliamentary secretary in the previous Local Government Ministry, was promoted minister of state in the Ministry of Labour, Welfare and Sports.

In another important shift, Errol Innis, formerly minister of state in the Finance Ministry, has been moved to Manley's office to oversee the policy unit.

Cabinet Reshuffle, Economic Plan Viewed

FL0601182092 Bridgetown CANA in English 1625 GMT 6 Jan 92

[Editorial from the Kingston Jamaica GLEANER dated 6 January]

[Text] "If by the mere reshuffling of the cabinet, the economic problems which have been bedeviling Jamaica could be solved, Prime Minister Michael Manley would indeed have handed the country a wonderful new year gift. But the country's economic problems are more challenging, and will test the mettle of the new minister of finance and planning, Mr. Hugh Small.

Undoubtedly, one of Mr. Small's immediate tasks is to help regenerate the public confidence, which has been lacking, in the government's management of the economy, and the minister has given the impression that he is very much aware of the task ahead.

The expectations, however, must be placed against the fact that, in the main, the government's monetary and fiscal policy direction is prescribed by the economic programme that is negotiated with its multilateral creditors—the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. In respect of the IMF, Mr. Small will take up from where his predecessor Mr. Patterson left off in the programme which is now before the fund for final approval. Whether the new minister will be in a position to seek a revision of the programme is left to be seen.

A major concern which Mr. Small must tackle, however, is how to reduce the severe inflationary pressure and its depressing impact on living standards. The government has made excessive use of monetary policy (high interest rates) in a desperate attempt to restrict aggregate demand, and ease the pressure on the exchange rate. Given the decline in the value of the Jamaica dollar against other major currencies, the measure, it is reasonable to argue, has had only minimal effects.

"On the other hand, we have seen where the overall fiscal deficit coupled with the level of losses incurred in the open market operations of the Bank of Jamaica have effectively served to fuel inflation. So, if Mr. Small can succeed in bringing about a further reduction in the fiscal deficit, and by implication, the level of public sector spending to what the government can afford, then there could be a new beginning to the solution of a fundamental problem.

For the difficulty in getting stability in the exchange rate, which the government says is a priority, cannot be divorced completely from the fiscal deficit. In short, the size of the public sector needs to be reduced further, leaving the private sector to generate the growth in real domestic product.

It must be clear to the government that the tight monetary policy of the last three years, imposed in response to the pressure on the international reserves, has forced many economic ventures near to collapse, pushing the economic levels of operation well below capacity. Certainly, conditions must be set to attract new investment. Mr. Small needs no reminder that this is the way forward."

El Salvador

Cristiani Delivers Special Message to Nation

PA0701050492 San Salvador Radio and Television Networks in Spanish 0200 GMT 7 Jan 92

["Special Message to the Salvadoran people" by President Alfredo Cristiani from the Presidential Palace in San Salvador; date not given—live or recorded]

[Text] Fellow countrymen: The time for peace has arrived in our fatherland after so much suffering and destruction caused by the armed conflict. It seemed almost impossible, and many still think it is impossible, that through negotiations we have been able to achieve the definitive agreements to put an end to the conflict. Nonetheless, this is the case in an unquestionable and irreversible manner.

The peace process that we proposed on the first day of our government has yielded the results we wanted. This pleases us and makes us very happy, because peace is the supreme aspiration of our people. We Salvadorans are attaining that peace through agreements and understandings, without any dogmatism or arrogance.

When we took over the presidency of the Republic, our first responsibility was to attain peace in order to strengthen democracy in our country. From the very first moment, we understood that as long as the conflict continued, all efforts to push the country forward were seriously limited. That is why we proposed to establish a serious and responsible negotiation process that would open the road for peace without affecting the legal framework.

Many thought that the law was a barrier to peace among the Salvadorans. Now, it must be admitted that we have used legal mechanisms in order to make the agreements possible. Without harming our security and order, we have reached the end of the conflict and given the people new possibilities for progress within an atmosphere of peace and liberty.

It is time to set aside hatred, rancor, prejudice, and extremism in El Salvador. At 2400 on 31 December 1991, war was left behind. Now, we are only concluding the details of the procedures to establish a timetable for the agreements we have reached, which are final and complete. The end of the military confrontation will be a nine-month phase between 1 February and 31 October 1992. During that time, we will gradually implement the agreements as they permit. During that period of time, the military structure of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front [FMLN] will also be dissolved in order to allow its members to join the civilian, political, and institutional life within a legal framework.

In other words, the country will experience complete normalcy by 31 October 1992, without any threat of war for the country. As you will see in the New York Agreement that was signed on 31 December 1991, it includes some very specific aspects that are not part of the negotiations that were concluded in New York, but it is a framework for the beginning of the peace process.

We want to clarify something and that is that the signing of the New York Accord, and even the signing of the peace agreements in Mexico on 16 January 1992, should not be considered as an end to the conflict, but rather as the beginning of a process to consolidate peace and democracy in our country.

As you may have seen from what has been published of the New York Agreement signed on 31 December at the United Nations, this agreement represents the general framework under which the peace process in our country begins. The substantial agreements that were reached by that date are not included in that agreement; however, it does include important aspects such as the end of the armed conflict, which—as I have already said—will begin on 1 February, or the end of the process, which will be on 31 October 1992.

You may also be asking yourselves about two matters that have not been concluded. In the New York Agreement these matters are not described as substantial agreements, but rather technical aspects pending decisions. The reason the two aspects were not concluded was because Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar was ending his term as UN Secretary General at 2400 on 31 December 1991. That is why they agreed to meet again—the meetings began yesterday—to give the finishing touches to the two matters. If an agreement is not reached—something that we doubt will happen after the hard work done by the two commissions—regarding the schedule to be followed for implementation of the substantial agreements and the ways to end the FMLN military structure during the cease-fire period, the UN secretary general will present his proposal. We have all agreed to accept the proposal as part of the agreement. Therefore, we can say, with great pleasure, that the negotiations have ended and that we must not view the signing of the agreement as an end to the conflict, but rather as a phase toward the consolidation of peace and democracy in our country. In other words, we must, as of this moment work to ensure that our future becomes a better future.

I would like to take advantage of this opportunity to talk to you about some significant aspects of the agreements reached on substantial matters; those aspects have not been widely publicized in light of the fact that the agreements will not be signed until 16 January. However, I do believe that you should be aware of the most important aspects of the agreements. As of 16 January, the government will explain, in detail, each of the aspects.

To understand the agreements, we must first analyze the abridged agenda which was agreed upon in New York in September 1991. The matters pending negotiation were included in that abridged agenda. The most important

matter included in the agenda, probably the most problematic issue throughout this whole process, was the Armed Forces. I would like to begin by recalling that from the very beginning the government of the Republic said that to attain peace in our country, we were willing to seek a qualitative and quantitative reorganization of the Salvadoran Armed Forces. In general terms, we believe that the structure and size of our Armed Forces is the result of the armed conflict that began in our country in 1980. Once this conflict ends, it is only logical that the Armed Forces' structure and size should be reorganized. However, the constitutional amendments state that the Salvadoran Armed Forces will continue to be a permanent institution and that the only changes to be made will be those to make it qualitatively and quantitatively acceptable within the peace process.

The Armed Forces Agreement includes several aspects. Among these aspects are the doctrinaire principles of the Armed Forces. I will read the most important part of the agreement because I believe that this is the best way for you to understand what is behind each of these agreements. The agreement reads:

Doctrinaire Principles of the Armed Forces

The doctrine for the Armed Forces, as of the Constitutional amendments agreed upon in April 1991 in accordance with the law, will conform to the principles listed below and in the future will serve as guidelines for its institutional and educational system. The Armed Forces will strictly abide by said principles.

A. The Armed Forces have the mission to defend the state's sovereignty and the integrity of the territory under the terms of the regimen defined for them by the Constitution and the laws. Their compliance is inseparable from the democratic values and from the strict respect for the Constitution in all its parts.

B. According to what has been established in the Constitution, the Armed Forces are a permanent institution at the service of the nation. They are obedient, professional, apolitical, and nondeliberative. The Armed Forces are an institutional regimen and their actions shall also be in keeping with the principles that stem from the state of law; from the primacy of human beings and their rights; and from the respect and defense of the sovereignty of the Salvadoran people and of the Armed Forces as an institution separate from all political and ideological considerations, social positions, or other prejudices. The armed institution is subordinate to constitutional authorities.

These two paragraphs practically summarize the doctrine of the Armed Forces. The Armed Forces are democratic, respectful of the rights of citizens, and at the service of the nation.

In addition, some proposals have been made regarding the educational system of the Armed Forces mainly to give a more complete character to the training of those people who wish to have a military career by becoming professionals of the Salvadoran Armed Forces.

In that regard, perhaps the most important aspect is contained in Paragraph C, which reads: the plans and programs of study aimed at the training of the Armed Forces will also include—in addition to the technical-military courses—scientific and humanistic courses aimed at the integral development of students so they can actively participate in the country's institutional life. This will encourage a harmonious relationship with civilian society and the student's normal development in society.

The military academy will have a collegiate system and an academic council. The director of the military academy will be the president of the council and, together with the council, will decide on academic matters such as admission to the military academy and all aspects related to the education of the new Armed Forces officers.

We also agreed to evaluate the current Armed Forces members. The evaluation will be made by a commission that has been called the Ad Hoc commission. I will now read the norms that the Ad Hoc commission will use for this evaluation:

A. The evaluation will take into account the past performance of each officer, especially:

1. His previous observance of legal order. A special emphasis will be placed on his respect for human rights, both in his personal conduct and in the severity he has ordered to discipline and punish the guerrillas. Arbitrary actions and human rights violations carried out under his command, especially if serious or systematic violations of the latter have been observed, will be noted.

2. His professional qualifications.

3. His disposition to develop in the new peacetime reality and in a democratic society and to promote the country's democratization by strict adherence to human rights and his support to the reunification of the Salvadoran society, which is the goal agreed upon by the parts in accordance with the Geneva Convention.

In accordance with Paragraph C of this chapter, the existence of serious deficiencies in one or any of the mentioned aspects of the evaluation will be sufficient grounds for any decision made by the Ad Hoc commission. Paragraph C says the following:

The Ad Hoc commission will make decisions after it has interviewed the officers and will base its decisions on what is established in Paragraph A, which I read previously, of this chapter. The decision can include the transfer of an officer and, if the case so merit it, the discharge of the personnel being evaluated.

The Ad Hoc commission will be formed by three civilians, who have already been chosen according to the procedures established with the U.N. general secretary.

The commission members are Dr. Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, Dr. Abraham Rodriguez, and Dr. Eduardo Molina Olivares. In addition, the commission will have two Armed Forces members who are to be appointed by the president of the republic at the proper time.

Regarding the reduction of the Armed Forces, which is the qualitative aspect of its restructuring, an assessment was made of the different guidelines that were to be taken into account to prepare the program for the reduction of the Salvadoran Armed Forces. The New York Agreement stipulated that guidelines be established for the reduction of the Armed Forces and this is the only stipulation included in this final agreement. However, using these guidelines as a starting point, The Armed Forces of El Salvador have prepared a reduction process that calls for reducing approximately 50 percent of the troops, as well as materiel, installations, and organization, all of which will be affected by the reduction of the Armed Forces. This process will last 22 months, inasmuch as it is not feasible to make a drastic reduction. Too many Armed Forces members would enter the civilian society at a time when there are hardly any prospects for them. The time allotted will ensure tranquility and secure the compliance of the peace process. It will also enable the Armed Forces members to enter the country's productive life.

The following topic was called: overcoming impunity. As you may recall, we agreed to form what was called the Truth Commission in Mexico in April 1991. That commission will investigate the events that occurred in the past so that society can learn what happened. The knowledge of this truth will ensure that events like the ones we are now trying to end will never happen in our fatherland again. UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar has already formed the Truth Commission and its members are: Former Colombian President Belisario Bethancourt, Former Venezuelan Foreign Minister Reynaldo Figueredo, and International Law Professor Thomas Burgenthal from the United States of North America.

Regarding the public security corps, the agreement basically stipulates that a new National Civilian Police [PNC] will be formed and organized to preserve security and public order in our country and the current public security corps will be changed thus: During the transition phase, the national police will be tasked with the organization of the new PNC and later on its members will be able to apply to this PNC.

Referring to the National Guard and the Treasury Police, they will be eliminated as public security corps and their members will be incorporated into the Armed Forces of El Salvador.

The intelligence services: As we all know, there is currently the National Intelligence Directorate, which operates under the Defense Ministry. We agreed to create a state intelligence organization that would be directly under the presidency of the Republic to analyze all the situations that may arise concerning intelligence issues. Military intelligence will be under the different Armed Forces units.

A separate paragraph was written on the Rapid Deployment Infantry Battalions [BIRIs] because these battalions were created because of the internal conflict. The type of conflict that prevailed in our country made it necessary to train certain battalions so that, as their name aptly puts it, they could react in a much quicker way, without as much red tape as other units. Instead, they had to be ready to go into action and handle any situation that may arise. Given that these BIRIs were specifically created for the internal conflict, their members will be transferred to other Armed Forces units and the battalions will be dissolved—meaning their existence as autonomous units.

Paramilitary Organizations: There is a paragraph which says: We recognize the principle that all paramilitary corps or groups must be outlawed within a legal state. We have reached the following conclusions on this issue. The civilian defense groups were also created during the conflict to provide protection in areas where there were no permanent Armed Forces or public security posts to protect the civilian population. However, the conflict has ended and these armed civil defense groups will disappear.

There is also the Armed Forces Reserves: a new system that will replace the territorial service system. This system will organize and operate the following: 1. An updated register of citizens in the reserves and those apt for military service. 2. An updated register of their military skills. 3. The issuance of a summons when their mobilization to active service is necessary to fulfill the mission that the constitution assigns to the Armed Forces. The new system will continue to operate under the Defense Ministry.

There will also be a special law—which will be sent to the Legislative Assembly—to regulate private security services. This deals with groups which provide security to persons, enterprises, officials, and everyone who wants to have his own security—for whatever reasons. Referring to this, the law must regulate the actions of these private security groups so that they are placed under special controls to organize their actions. The use of special weapons for this type of task makes it necessary to implement special controls. Some viewpoints have been drafted and will be added to the bill that will be later submitted to the Legislative Assembly.

Regarding the draft, all forms of drafting will be suspended when the end of military confrontations is implemented until the law that is mentioned in the following paragraph is in effect. This reads as follows: A new military service and reserve law will be promulgated. This law will establish the principle that the implementation of the military service is universal, mandatory, equitable, and indiscriminatory. In other words, the law will be sent shortly to the Legislative Assembly, once the

armed confrontation has ended, in order to regulate the compulsory military service that emanates from the Constitution of the Republic.

To conclude, there are some preventive measures including the effective operation of the Armed Forces Inspector General's Office; a law which punishes the illegal acquisition of riches; a cancellation of permits to private citizens for carrying weapons that are exclusively used by the Armed Forces; and the immediate gathering of such weapons.

Referring to the Armed Forces members who will be affected, in one way or another, by this reorganization, the last paragraph deals with their relocation. The paragraph reads: A. The relocation of troops which are members of units that are subject to an elimination or dismantling will be carried out in the measure that their relocation is compatible with the number of Armed Forces troops--according to the goals sought by the agreement and the conclusions and recommendations issued by the ad hoc commission that is specified in Chapter Three.

B. All the soldiers discharged as a result of the agreements will receive a compensation payment equivalent to 1 year's salary and the government will promote programs to help them join civilian life. Dear viewers, that is basically what the agreement contains on the different topics related to the Salvadoran Armed Forces.

As I said, we established the creation of a new national police to be called the PNC in the article dealing with the public security corps. Much has been said regarding this agreement. We think, however, that we have achieved something good for the country. We think that the PNC—the way it has been ultimately structured with a great deal of advice from the countries that have experience in this respect—will greatly benefit the country.

I will also read articles or paragraphs from the agreement so you can have an idea of what the much talked about PNC is all about. At the end, of course, I will talk about the transition phase, which is very important until the PNC is created.

Creation of the PNC: The PNC will be created in accordance with the constitutional reform agreed upon in the Mexico Agreement. The PNC will be a new corps, with a new organization, new cadres, new mechanism for training and practice, and a new doctrine. It will be the only armed police corps with nationwide authority. Its mission will be to protect and guarantee the free exercise of the rights and liberties of all persons; to prevent and fight all kinds of crimes; and to maintain internal peace, tranquillity, order, and public security in urban and rural areas.

The PNC has also been given special doctrinary principles in accordance with what a professional and modern national police force is, and they basically cover the duties given to the police by the National Constitution, the aspect of the service to the community, and the respect of the rights of all the citizens of the country.

Regarding the PNC's territorial and functional structure, the PNC will be directed by civilian authorities. These will be: the president of the Republic, the minister, the deputy minister, the director general of the police, the deputy general directors, the inspector general, the chiefs of division of each service, and the chiefs of departmental precincts. The director general of the PNC will be appointed by the president of the Republic. He may be removed by a resolution from the Legislative Assembly because of serious human rights violations. The commanders of the PNC shall be civilians.

Without going against all that has been established in this agreement regarding the transition period, which I will refer to later, the PNC will be under a new interior and public security ministry. We must recall that the National Police used to be assigned under the Interior Ministry before and was later passed over, around the decade of the thirties, to the Defense Ministry. Now, the new police is born under the Interior Ministry, to which the old National Police used to be assigned. The current Interior Ministry will be reorganized to that effect. A Deputy Public Security Ministry will be created and it will be in charge of the relations with the PNC. The structure of public security will be totally new.

As for the nature of the organization, the PNC will have a centralized organization, since it will be structured at a national level so that it can perform all the tasks entrusted to the police. Its functioning, however, will be decentralized, as there will be departmental police precincts, in line with the country's administrative division. Here we have a very important thing. Owing to the nature of the functions entrusted to certain agencies that structurally belong to the PNC, these agencies may work under the functional direction of other authorities, within the terms expressed later. Following are the divisions of the police. There is the National Security Division, which will be perhaps the better known as it will be in charge of maintaining security, order, public security, traffic, and, in sum, everything related to the traditional duties of a public security corps like the national police. It will also have the Criminal Investigation Division. Here we have the first example of the functional aspect. It reads as follows: Under the functional direction of the Attorney General, the Criminal Investigation Division will be in charge of investigating criminal activities and gather proof that may serve to identify those responsible for perpetrating them.

In other words, the Constitution of the Republic gives the attorney general of the Republic the task of carrying out the scientific investigation of crime. Nevertheless, modern police forces also have a division of criminal investigations, and that is why from a constitutional point of view this police division will be functioning under the attorney general of the Republic, even though it will be under the police.

The Border Division will oversee and control entries and departures, activities and expulsions of foreigners, and the migration of nationals as well as surveillance and control at civilian, public, and private airports.

The Finance Division will operate under the Finance Ministry—this is the second example of a division operating within another official body—without affecting the functions of fiscal surveillance. This division will be in charge of preventing and fighting violations of fiscal regulations.

The Weapons and Explosives Division will implement everything that is legally established in our country concerning the ownership and bearing of arms, business transactions, importation of weapons, and so forth.

The Division for the Protection of Dignitaries is a division specializing in providing security for visiting presidents or other dignitaries, as well as for important national officials.

The Environmental Division will protect something truly important for our country. This will be under the Agriculture and Livestock Ministry, even though the division will be part of the National Police.

We then move on to the members of the PNC. This is very important because we want a PNC that will truly serve the community. That is why the entrance requirements for personnel must be very clear, precise, and well-balanced so new policemen will be able to carry out their duties.

The profile states: PNC members must want to serve the community, be capable of handling human relationships, possess emotional maturity, and be physically able to serve as policemen. They must be qualified to serve in a police corps whose concepts, structures, and practices are proper. The PNC is a civilian institution destined to protect and guarantee the free exercise of rights and the liberties of people; to prevent and fight all sorts of crimes; and to maintain internal peace, tranquillity, order, and public security.

They must also be qualified to adapt their behavior to the doctrine and legal framework of the PNC. Entry into both the National Academy of Public Security as well as into the corps will require that candidates meet all profile requirements, for which specific evaluation criteria will be prepared based on strict norms according to the level of responsibility.

One of the basic requirements the PNC candidates must meet are educational requirements. There are three different requirements: On the basic level, in other words, for being a policeman, the candidate must have completed the ninth grade. Those who are promoted to the rank of police sergeants must have a high school diploma. The mid-level executive officers must have satisfactorily completed three years of university studies or the equivalent. The high-ranking officers, except for officials who are appointed by the Presidency of the Republic, must have a university degree or equivalent.

The other general requirements for admission are: Candidates must be Salvadoran citizens by birth; they must be 18 years of age at the time of application; they must have the required educational background; they must be in good physical condition; they must respect all citizens' rights—and this is very important because some have tried to confuse this aspect; they must not have a criminal record; and they must have passed the entrance examinations to verify that candidates meet the requirements and the profile to belong to the PNC according to the level of responsibility as defined in this accord.

The entrance examinations will include a cultural, physical, medical, and psychotechnological exam. These examinations will be complemented by personal interviews with the candidates.

As you can see, this is an attempt to give validity to a new PNC with new members and new structures. It will be a complete institution with professional members. This is why all these requirements are so important. They are important because they ensure that new members of the PNC will be people who will be at the service of the people.

The new Public Security Academy will also be under the Interior Ministry. For the time being, while they organize themselves, the Public Security Academy and the PNC will be under the presidency of the Republic. Once the transition period has ended, they will fall under the jurisdiction of the Interior Ministry.

Lastly, and perhaps the most important aspect of the agreement on the PNC, is its transitory status. I wish to be very clear about this. Much has been said in the past few days. There are no quotas for any group or for any sector to join the PNC; there are no predetermined positions for anyone in particular, regardless of what group he belongs to. What actually exists is simply nondiscrimination in the admission of the PNC as long as the admission requirements are met and as long as members graduate from the Public Security Academy. The transition period is very important. Much has been said about whether there will be special quotas for a particular group. As I said earlier, the agreement does not include quotas or automatic entry into the institution. The transition period includes organization. During that period the PCN will not be under a ministry. The general director will be under the direct orders of the president of the Republic. The organization of the PNC will be directed by the general director. The general director will be appointed by the presidency of the Republic. He will be selected from a three-name list to be submitted by Copaz [National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace] to the presidency.

Then we have the range of duties of the PNC. Naturally there cannot be a public security vacuum while the new Public Security Academy accepts and graduates candidates. That is why a special section has been given to the

range of duties. The agreement states that as the first candidates complete their education and graduate from the academy they will be assigned duties in a department; in other words, department by department. While this is occurring, the current National Police will offer public security throughout the country. Once the new PNC members are ready to assume their responsibilities in a department, the transition will be made. In this manner the National Police will no longer be responsible for ensuring security in that department and the new PCN will assume those duties.

Other duties are—and I would like to read this also—while the new corps is being formed according to the terms established in this agreement, the current National Police will continue to fulfill its current public security duties. The National Police will abide by the orders of the PNC general director in accordance with the following paragraph:

The National Police will be the only current public security corps that will retain duties of this nature during the transition period and be subject to international supervision by the United Nations, through Onusal [UN Observers for El Salvador], with the help of specialists from countries with experience in organizing and operating a civilian police corps. The portion on the transition period and duties continues.

The duties in the conflict areas are difficult duties because stability must be ensured during the transition period. The PNC general director will determine the special guidelines to be followed in these areas.

Then we have the Public Security Academy that will, in the beginning, be under the presidency of the Republic, and later under the Interior Ministry.

Regarding personnel, we again beg you to be patient, but we believe it is important for you to listen to the text to avoid confusion regarding the agreement.

Personnel: The criteria and mechanisms for the selection and training of personnel will be within the framework of the concept of the PNC as a new corps, with a new organization, new cadres, new mechanisms for training and practice, and a new doctrine. In this context—this is the important part—the incorporation of personnel who have not directly participated in the armed conflict will be endorsed. This will be done without detriment to the rights of the former members of the National Police and the former FMLN fighters; they will not be discriminated against in the selection of personnel and can join the PNC in accordance with this agreement.

Regarding the former members of the National Police, it says, they will be able to join the PNC within the terms of this agreement after their conduct has been evaluated and as long as they meet the admission requirements and go through the new National Public Security Academy. The evaluation will be made by the general director of the PNC.

The former FMLN fighters will be able to join the PNC if they meet the requirements and admittance procedures established for them by Copaz and after they attend the new Public Security Academy. The Copaz admittance procedures follow the criteria used in the agreement, and Copaz will be able to establish special requirements for the former FMLN fighters. In the cease-fire verification, Onusal will ensure that the applicants who invoke this condition—that is, that they are former FMLN fighters—have effectively and definitely abandoned the armed struggle. All this will be supervised and ensured by Copaz.

The agreement then goes on about recruitment at different levels and the criteria that must be met. The courses for the basic level will be six-months-long, and for the intermediate and superior levels they will be one year long.

This is basically the agreement regarding the PNC; the structure has been defined in more detail, but due to a lack of time I have only read the most important points.

The next points in the New York Agreements cover the judiciary and electoral systems. These agreements date back to the Mexico Agreement in April when the constitutional reforms were approved; they concern the Judiciary Training School and the Attorney General's Office for the Defense of Human Rights. It has been decided to entrust Copaz with preparing the draft bills on this, so these can be sent to the Legislative Assembly.

As for the electoral system, Copaz has also been asked to appoint a special commission to study or analyze the possible reforms to the electoral code and present them to the Legislative Assembly.

Then we have the socioeconomic issues. This has been divided into four aspects. The first one is the agrarian or land problem, and it has created much unrest and uncertainty. As this is very delicate, I would like to read in detail the agreements to this effect.

Concerning the agrarian problem, it says: 1. On the lands that exceed the constitutional limit of 245 hectares, the Government of El Salvador will ensure the transfer of the rural areas suitable for farming that have not yet been transferred according to Articles 105 and 267 of the National Constitution. The government also commits itself to verifying that the implementation of the constitutional provision will not be evaded by the owners of rural areas that exceed 245 hectares. This is nothing more than compliance with the Constitution itself.

2. As for government lands that are not currently national parks: The Salvadoran Government will ensure the transfer to the beneficiaries of the Agrarian Reform Law, according to Article 104 of the Constitution, of rural lands suitable for farming that are not state property and are not national parks. As for the various programs for the transfer of lands that are being implemented by the Salvadoran Government with state-owned farm lands, preference will be given to former

fighters from both sides who voluntarily request it. They must be of peasant origin with a farming know-how and they must not own lands. The size of the lots will be determined according to the availability mentioned above and the number of beneficiaries who qualify according to what has been stipulated in this paragraph.

The distribution of state lands was already accounted for in the law for the consolidation of the Agrarian Reform Law, which is called land tenure; it was in effect in April of this year.

3. As for the lands that were offered to the state: Making use of its legal, technical, and financial resources, the Salvadoran Government will attempt to purchase and transfer lands that are voluntarily sold by its owners through the land bank. Once such lands are purchased, they must be transferred to the beneficiaries of the Agrarian Reform Law.

4. As for the beneficiaries of lands that are transferred according to the aforementioned paragraphs: The lands that will be distributed according to the implementation of sections 1, 2, and 3 of this agreement will be aimed at satisfying the need for land of peasants and small farmers, who lack them. The lands will be specifically legally transferred to the peasants and small farmers defined by law as the beneficiaries of the agrarian reform law.

Payment of lands: The transfer of the lands mentioned in the aforementioned paragraphs will be made at market prices and under the same conditions of credit granted to the beneficiaries of the Agrarian Reform Law. In addition, systems of payments may be established based on fixed, long-term prices at low fixed interest rates. Internal credit shall be complemented by financing coming from international cooperation, for which a special fund will be created for the purchase of lands financed with foreign resources.

As for lands in the conflict zones: This is also something we feel is very important in the agreement and that is why I will also read it textually.

It reads: Land tenure in conflict areas. According to the New York Agreement, the current state of land tenure will be respected within the areas of conflict until a legal solution is found to the definitive land tenure regimen. Consequently, those in possession of lands shall not be evicted until the aforementioned solution is not found. On the contrary, they will receive financial support so as to increase agriculture production. Bearing in mind the irregular nature of the land tenure regimen in the areas of conflict, the parties agree to hold an inventory of cases to which this article may apply.

This part is especially drafted for those who have lands in areas of conflict, which for security reasons, have not been visited and have possibly been cultivated by other individuals. It reads: Within the 30-day period following the signature of the agreements, the FMLN will submit an inventory of the property or buildings seized by them. After verifying that the property lies within the stipulations of the current agreement and in accordance with the procedures established in the next article, the Salvadoran Government will try to provide a legal and satisfactory solution to the definitive land tenure problem by means of a voluntary purchase-sale of the property between the legitimate owner and the person in possession of the land. If the legitimate owner does not wish to sell his property, the Salvadoran Government will make an attempt, within the legal mechanisms at its disposal, to resettle the peasants or farmers in lands that are available for this purpose. The government will make an attempt as much as possible to resettle them within the same area.

Then we have the creation of a special commission, which will be appointed by Copaz, that will supervise this agreement and see to it that everything described here is complied with and that the law is not violated.

Land tenure will be legalized within a six-month period. The payment of the lands, as I said, will be at market prices and the sale of lands to small peasants or farmers will be under the same terms as those observed by the beneficiaries of the agrarian reform law.

As for the 3 July 1991 Agreement—remember it was signed between the agriculture minister, the defense minister, and the peasant organizations. It reads: the agreement on occupied lands between the Salvadoran Government and the peasant organizations will be respected. As for lands that may have been illegally occupied after the implementation of the agreement, the Salvadoran Government will reserve the right to enforce the law so as to guarantee the state of law.

As for credit for the agricultural sector, it states that given the end of the conflict, the agricultural sector will need greater credit and an attempt will be made to bring lines of credit from abroad so that the entire agricultural sector can have financing. An attempt will also be made to strengthen those financial institutions such as the Agriculture and Livestock Guarantee Fund [Fondo de Garantia Agropecuario], the FIDAP [not further identified], and the Development Bank. There will also be technical assistance through a program that is being promoted at the national level and is currently being implemented. Lastly, we have international cooperation for the agricultural sector; this is some of the possible assistance that our country could receive.

Point 2 refers to the measures that are intended to alleviate the social cost of structural adjustment programs. There are basically two agreements here. One is a consumer defense law which authorizes the Economy Ministry to implement the law. That will be done by preventing monopolistic activities and everything else that violates healthy and free enterprise and negatively affects consumers. Regarding privatization, it will encourage society's participation in the purchase of shares; which is what is being done concerning the privatization of banks—where banking employees and

small investors have been allowed to participate. There is also a paragraph that says the government will strive to strengthen, with foreign aid, programs that are currently being implemented.

There is another point about a forum—to be created with the equal participation of government, labor, and business groups—to reach a series of agreements whose goal will be the country's economic and social development for the people's benefit. The consultations will be carried out in phases, bearing in mind that the goal is to reach agreements that will be immediately implemented to achieve stability; solve the economic and social problems that may arise at the end of the conflict; and solve any other problems that may arise during the reconstruction phase.

That is followed by the installation mechanisms. Copaz will issue, for the first time, the summons for a forum, and it will define the forum's authority.

Lastly, there is the national reconstruction plan. The proper explanation has already been given to various groups and the same explanation will be given to the FMLN, which will be able to submit suggestions through the UN Development Program. That way they can be included in the reconstruction plan that will be carried out by the Salvadoran Government. Mechanisms are being created to seek the necessary support to finance the plan.

That is followed by what is probably the most important agreement—which was first discussed during the New York meeting—meaning the cease-fire agreement. The cease-fire is an irreversible, short, and dynamic process. Its duration is predetermined and it must be implemented throughout the national territory of El Salvador. There will be no substantial negotiations during the cease-fire, only the necessary measures to implement the agreements reached during the negotiations. The cease-fire is comprised of four elements: First, the cease-fire per se, which begins on 1 February. Second, the phase calling for the separation of forces, which includes the Armed Forces' pullout [repliegue], in two phases, to what would become a deployment phase in times of peace. The FMLN will also conduct a two-phase pullout to what will be approximately 15 designated zones. Those designated zones will be controlled by Onusal to guarantee that the cease-fire is implemented. The implementation of the third phase is yet to be defined because it involves some technical aspects. It deals with the dismantling of the FMLN's military structure, which is the step prior to its incorporation into the country's political, institutional, and civilian life within a fully legal status. The fourth element of the cease-fire deals with the United Nations' verification of all the activities dealing with the cease-fire. In general terms, those are the agreements we have reached.

Of course, the FMLN has expressed its desire to become an unarmed political force after the cease-fire, the end of the armed confontration. There is an agreement to establish a timetable for some political activities so that the FMLN can undertake the transition once it has disarmed. The first point about that is clear in stating that legislative measures or other necessary measures will be adopted to guarantee the former FMLN combatants the full exercise of their civilian and political rights for their return, within a framework of full legality, to civilian, political, and institutional life in the country. Other points include, at a given time, the release of all those detained for political reasons, the return of disabled combatants, the authorization of media that the FMLN wants to legalize once it is fully exercising its rights; and, in sum, everything that serves as a guarantee so that the FMLN, once it has fulfilled the appropriate legal requirements, will have the option to become a political party with the same rights and duties as any other political party in our country.

This is, television viewers, the substantive aspects of the agreements. The agreements will begin to be fulfilled on 1 February. As I said before, some of them will be fulfilled before 31 October. Because of their nature, others will continue to be fulfilled after that. They include the reduction of the Armed Forces and the organization of the PNC.

The aspect of the conflict must not be seen from the standpoint that everything has ended and we have nothing else to do. Just the opposite, we must think that today is when we must all work together to consolidate peace. The signing of the agremeent is but the beginning of peace in our country. It is the beginning of the consolidation of democracy, of the respect for human rights, and of national reconciliation. Those were the great objectives that since 4 April 1990 were established in the Geneva Agreement, which began the work of the UN secretary general in the process that will conclude on 16 January.

Great tasks lie ahead of us, but they will be carried out in that other phase. We will be entering that phase on 16 January, the date of the solemn signing of the final agreements. We will especially be beginning that phase on 1 February, the date for the entry into force of the halt of the armed confrontation. That will be coordinated, guaranteed, and supervised by the United Nations.

In these historic moments that are very important for the fatherland, we want to urge our noble and beloved Salvadoran people—to which we are so proud to belong and whom we serve—that we join in this gigantic effort to realize the peace that is contained in the agreements that will be signed on 16 January in Mexico. With the support, devotion, trust, and enthusiasm of the people, peace and stability are guaranteed, democracy is protected, and progress is possible. The people are the only winners of the political solution to the conflict.

The people, who form part of a strong and responsible civilian population, are the undeniable winners. We invite the people to march together toward that destiny that we have won with stoicism and hope.

The golden rule in this new period of our history is the understanding through dialogue. The most difficult phase of work has been culminated with great success. We have other tasks ahead of us in order to continue implementing democracy. We have attained peace.

Salvadorans: The Lord has given us the precious gift of peace. After we have all worked very hard to attain it, let us thank The Lord for that marvelous gift by devoting ourselves to preserving and consolidating peace from now on. This is the great challenge we now have ahead. Let us face it with courage and honor. May The Lord enlighten us, strengthen us, and bless us all. Have a very good night.

Cristiani Announces Dissolution of Security Corps

PA0701033792 Paris AFP in Spanish 0314 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Text] San Salvador, 6 Jan (AFP)—President Alfredo Cristiani announced in a 6 January message to the nation the dissolution of the current security and paramilitary corps and the reduction of the Army. Explaining to the Salvadoran people the peace agreements reached on 31 December at the United Nations between the government and the rebels of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, Cristiani announced the creation of a National Civilian Police (PNC), which will be the sole security corps with professional personnel.

The president stressed that "there are no quotas of power for any group, and those aspiring to join the PNC will face no discrimination."

Cristiani explained that the National Guard and the Treasury Police will be dissolved as established by the peace agreements. The National Police will remain intact while the PNC is created during the transitional period. However, the National Police will ultimately be dissolved. Cristiani said that countries with experience in civilian police forces will help to create the PNC.

President Cristiani stated during an almost hour-long network that the comission to assess the Armed Forces has already been established and is tasked with programming the reduction of the Army. He added that paramilitary civil defense corps and the elite battalions will disappear because they were created for war.

The government and the guerrillas are continuing the last phase of the negotiations at the UN Headquarters to draft a timetable for implementing the agreements.

The formal signing of the peace agreement will take place on 16 January in Mexico City, and on 1 February hostilities will definitely cease, as stipulated by the "New York Agreements."

Armed Forces Announce Promotions, Rebel Actions

PA0601141492 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish 2104 GMT 4 Jan 92

[Excerpt] San Salvador, 4 Jan (NOTIMEX)—Four days after the Salvadoran Government and the guerrillas signed the peace agreement in New York, the Armed Forces announced the promotion of officers and reported violent actions in the interior of the country.

The Armed Forces Press Committee (Coprefa) reported that Colonel Mauricio Ernesto Vargas, deputy chief of staff, and Colonel Dionisio Ismael Machuca, National Police director, had been promoted to general.

Vargas is also a member of the government dialogue commission that signed the historic document with the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) to definitively end the 11-year civil war.

Machuca was also appointed inspector general of the Armed Forces. The appointment of the new National Police director is pending.

Without further details, Coprefa added that 12 lieutenant colonels stationed in different military garrisons were promoted to colonel.

The military report also stated that on 3 December FMLN units harassed Military Detachment No. 4 positions at Cacaopera, Morazan Department. No casualties were reported. [passage omitted]

Government To Negotiate Return of Refugees

PA0601152592 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1559 GMT 4 Jan 92

[Excerpts] Washington, 4 Jan (EFE)—The Salvadoran Government intends to negotiate with the United States for the gradual return of the 1 million refugees who presently reside in the United States. Jose Luis Trigueros, minister counselor of the Salvadoran Embassy in Washington, told EFE on 4 January that the return to El Salvador of those of his fellow countrymen who are temporarily settled in the United States is an issue that will be negotiated with U.S. authorities.

He said a massive and obligatory return of Salvadorans living in the United States to El Salvador "would be catastrophic."

Trigueros stated that due to the destruction of part of its sources of production and the effects of a 12-year civil war, El Salvador is in no condition to absorb a large number of Salvadorans returning from the United States. "We will look for a program that will allow Salvadorans to gradually return home," Trigueros announced. [passage omitted]

Trigueros told EFE that the Salvadoran Government will intensify communication with the international community—especially with the United States—to obtain the concessionary resources and voluntary contributions

needed to back the program to reconstruct the economy and rebuild the infrastructure destroyed by the war.

It is estimated that the reconstruction program will require approximately $2 billion over the next five years. [passage omitted]

Army Reportedly Kills 4 Guerrilla Fighters

PA0601224392 Hamburg DPA in Spanish 2139 GMT 6 Jan 92

[Text] San Salvador, 6 Jan (DPA)—The Salvadoran Army reported on 6 January that it killed four guerrillas last weekend during clashes in both the northern and eastern parts of the country, despite the signing of a cease-fire agreement on 31 December 1991 at the United Nations in New York.

The Armed Forces Press Committee, Coprefa, reported that the guerrillas were killed on 5 January when the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front [FMLN] tried to occupy the town of Dulce Nombre de Maria, 70 km north of San Salvador, and were repelled by troops of the 4th Infantry Brigade stationed in Paraiso.

Coprefa also reported that troops from the 5th Infantry Brigade stationed in San Vicente repelled an attack against military troops in San Benito de Mercedes Umana canton, 125 km east of San Salvador on 4 January.

The FMLN has made no mention of these actions. It is unknown whether they were offensive actions or clashes that took place when the Army tried to prevent some rebels from evacuating areas that have been assigned to them.

However, charges were filed by mass organizations today because of military actions by Army troops, who continue to recruit youths from the countryside as well as from neighborhoods in the capital and nearby villages.

Government, Rebels Hope To End Talks by 10 Jan

PA0601232792 Madrid EFE in Spanish 2113 GMT 6 Jan 92

[Text] United Nations, 6 Jan (EFE)—The Salvadoran Government and the guerrillas on 6 January stated they want to end the negotiations on the pending issues of the peace agreement on 10 January.

In the 31 December accords, the two sides agreed to resolve those issues by 10 January. They also agreed that if those issues are not resolved by 14 January at the latest, both sides will accept the formula presented by the United Nations in view of the fact that the agreement is scheduled to be signed in a special ceremony in Mexico on 16 January.

The points still pending are the timetable for the implementation of the agreements, the mechanisms to dismantle the guerrillas' military infrastructure, and the mechanisms for the guerrillas to return to civilian and political life in El Salvador.

Presidency Minister Oscar Santamaria, head of the government delegation, and Jorge Shafik Handal, commander of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), on 6 January expressed their hopes that everything will be resolved by 10 January. The FMLN presented its proposal to the United Nations on 5 January and the government did the same on 6 January.

Santamaria rejected the FMLN's criticism that the government delegation was late for the new round of talks, which the 31 December agreements had scheduled for 5 January. We have not lost time, Santamaria said. He added that the FMLN met with the UN mediators on 5 January and the government is doing so on 6 January. He added that "all of this has taken place under the authority of the United Nations."

"We have not broken our commitment in any way," the Salvadoran minister stated. He returned to New York late on 5 January.

Guatemala

Politicians React to Salvadoran Peace Agreement

PA0301151692 Guatemala City Teleonce Television in Spanish 1800 GMT 2 Jan 92

[Excerpt] On 2 January, political groups in Guatemala issued the first reaction to the peace agreements signed between the Salvadoran Government and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front [FMLN]. Vice President Gustavo Espina Salguero; Defense Minister Jose Domingo Garcia Samayoa; and Herlindo Alvarez del Cid, president of the congressional Central American Affairs Commission, commented on the agreements and the possibilities of the peace process in Guatemala bearing fruit this year:

[Begin recording] [Espina] I believe—as I said on another occasion—that there are world forces making many of these accomplishments possible. They will undoubtedly have repercussions. I would rather abstain from commenting, because our process has been different from Salvadoran one. Our situations are completely different. I believe that we must be prudent in handling our process.

Nevertheless, I wish to say that we feel optimistic. Early last year we told you reporters that peace in Guatemala was very close. There were some skeptics, but on 2 January, on the first workday of January, I reaffirm that peace is drawing near in Guatemala. President Serrano has made great efforts from the very beginning to leave behind, as a black page in our history, the 30 years of suffering, war, and pain that have claimed so many casualties.

I do not know the official statistics on the dead and crippled, on damage to the infrastructure, and on how much the economic loss amounts to in El Salvador and Guatemala, which have had the bloodiest conflicts on record in Central America. I believe that better times are yet to come. Once peace is consolidated in Guatemala,

Central America will enjoy very significant growth. We are very optimistic that 1992 will help us move forward. We will be motivated by the hope that Guatemala will do its part.

[Garcia] I am pleased with this development, and feel optimistic. The use of viable and civilized means to achieve an understanding that would bring development to a country within a framework of security is a healthy development. I hope that it will soon materialize. I understand that on 16 January the parties will meet again in Mexico for the final signing of a document to legalize the demobilization as well as other procedures, which I believe will lead to an integration of the FMLN into the political life of the country.

[Unidentified Reporter] What positive effects do you believe that development will have on Central America?

[Garcia] I imagine that it will have to be taken into consideration, because Central America will have peace. Practically, only one group persists in promoting violence to achieve its objectives, which basically are fulfilling the needs of the people and attaining peace. In that sense, we feel that the total peace proposal made by the constitutional president of the republic is the one that is most likely to satisfy the socioeconomic needs of the people. At this stage, we must realize that the best way to solve our problems is not through weapons.

[Alvarez] I believe that the signing of a peace agreement in El Salvador is a great advance for Central America. It is a very positive step. We believe that the various groups in Guatemala interested in attaining peace must see it as a great example. Of course, the fact that a peace agreement was signed does not necessarily mean that it has been attained. Peace will depend on the signatories' compliance with those agreements in order to end the conflict and finally attain durable peace in El Salvador.[end recording] [passage omitted]

Promotions, Appointments in Armed Forces

PA0601195092 Guatemala City EL GRAFICO in Spanish 3 Jan 92 p 6

[Text] Six important changes in the Armed Forces were disclosed yesterday, which include several military commanders.

The following appointments were made: General Julio Francisco Otzoy Colaj, commander of the Mariscal Zabala brigade; General Carlos Eduardo Santizo, commander of the Honor Guard; General Luis Felipe Miranda Trejo, head of the Mobile Military Police; General Julio Balconi Turcios, director of the Polytechnic School.

General Jose Luis Quilo Ayuso was appointed deputy defense minister.

Other appointments made were: General Sergio Antonio Camargo, director of the Center of Military Studies; Luis Francisco Rosito, Inspector General of the Army; John Rivera Perez, head of the Information and Press Department of the Army, DIDE.

Meanwhile the DIDE has reported that the following colonels will be promoted to general in a ceremony to be held shortly: Gustavo Adolfo Rosito, Julio Federico Otzoy, Eduardo Santizo Franco, Julio Banconi, Sergio Arnoldo Camargo Franco, and Carlos Enrique Pineda Carranza.

The promotions, proposed by Brigadier General Jose Domingo Garcia Samayoa, minister of national defense, will take place in each of the commands to which the officers belong.

It was reported that to obtain a promotion, each of the officers had to fulfill the requirements established by the Constitution and by the Army, such as taking an established study program and passing the physical and mental tests that demonstrate the capacity and ability to fulfill the responsibilities assumed by each of the promoted officers.

To conclude, the military spokesman said that the promotions demonstrate that in Guatemala there is a qualified Army ready to face any eventuality.

Honduras

Minister Pleased With Salvadoran Peace Accord

PA0501012692 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 1520 GMT 4 Jan 92

[Text] Tegucigalpa, 4 Jan (ACAN-EFE)—Honduran Foreign Minister Mario Carias Zapata said on 4 January that the consolidation of the Salvadoran peace accords will promote a new military balance in Central America. The minister said that the 31 December agreement between the Salvadoran Government and guerrillas is of "historic importance." He expressed the hope that it will bring the definite end of the war in El Salvador.

One of the aspects highlighted by Carias Zapata is the goal of establishing a timetable for the disarmament and demobilization of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). That will lead to "a reduction in the government's Army," he added. Carias Zapata said that the Salvadoran demilitarization will promote a "new regional military balance," one of the points still pending in Central America's pacification process.

"Honduras hopes that with peace, resources will be renewed and reoriented toward regional integration and economic development, instead of being used for the purchase of weapons and confrontation," he added.

The Salvadoran Army is approximately 60,000 strong and has been one of the main opponents to the limitation of troops and weapons in Central America, arguing that it is facing a military conflict with the guerrillas.

Army Chief Reserves Comment

PA0301205892 San Pedro Sula LA PRENSA in Spanish 3 Jan 92 p 5

[Text] Tegucigalpa—Armed Forces Chief General Luis Alonso Discua has said he would rather wait for results before commenting on the military agreements signed in New York by the Salvadoran Government and rebels.

Central Americans "want the region to have peace, without violence, and calm in order to follow the path to development and welfare for all," he added. We must be optimistic about the results of the New York Agreements. At the same time, he stressed that there are still some delicate points that must be solved in order to definitely attain peace. Such aspects include the demobilization of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front and other topics inherent to that group's participation in the political life of El Salvador.

Regarding the changes in the Honduran Army's high command, Discua said they were "normal" and gave assurances there would be no rotation of branch commanders. He said speaking at this time of changes in the military structure would only be speculation. "The changes that were going to take place have already been made and everybody is where they should be," he said.

Foreign Ministry Press Director Removed From Post

PA0601025092 San Pedro Sula TIEMPO in Spanish 2 Jan 92 p 3

[Text] Tegucigalpa—As of 1 January 1992, Eugenio Castro Claramount is no longer information and press director at the Foreign Relations Ministry. He was appointed to that post during the Liberal administration of President Jose Azcona Hoyo and has held it for the past five years.

Foreign Ministry sources pointed out that in the past few months there had been talk of replacing Castro Claramount because he did not relate well to other officials, including Foreign Minister Mario Carias Zapata. In fact, he has not moderated the most recent news conferences.

A note signed by Castro Claramount and distributed among the media thanks them for their cooperation. It states: "I have the pleasure to address you to report that as of 1 January 1992 I am no longer this ministry's information and press director."

The authorities have not yet named Castro Claramount's replacement.

Electrical Power Workers Union Ends Strike

PA0501140892 Tegucigalpa LA TRIBUNA in Spanish 2 Jan 92 p 9

[Text] The leaders of the National Enterprise for Electric Power Workers Union (STENEE) have decided to end the strike, after the government statement declaring the strike illegal, on condition that the situation of 127 dismissed workers be resolved on the morning of 2 January.

STENEE President Gladys Lanza made the aforementioned statement on 1 January. She explained that such aspects as the return of workers to their posts and the lawsuit by a special judge will be discussed on 2 January with the high-level government commission. The discussion of the aforementioned points was scheduled for 31 December, based on a reform document presented by STENEE. The reform document was in turn based on the act that was proposed by the government and discussed well into the early morning hours of 27 December.

The government act establishes the "leave" or suspension for 30 months of half of those who were dismissed, most of whom are labor leaders. According to the document, other workers will definitely be dismissed.

Although it was originally stated that the strike would be resolved by 27 December, the United Federation of Honduran Workers (FUTH)—supported by the remaining labor federations—decided not to sign the agreement, and to analyze it with the STENEE rank and file. Then the FUTH special assembly decided to take steps to reform the act, and if necessary to declare a general strike.

"That is what we did. We presented our recommendations to the government on 30 December, but there was no meeting because of the holiday. Thus, we decided to talk to Mauro Membreno, minister of communications, public works, and transportation," Lanza explained. "He promised the meeting would take place on 2 January (today), and we promised to call the members of our organizations back to work. We were told there would be no reprisals, and they guaranteed compliance with workers' rights," Lanza continued.

In the last few weeks, based on the Labor Ministry's statement declaring the 24-hour strike staged on 2 November to be illegal, the power company has fired 127 employees, including the members of the STENEE central board of directors and other sections. The strike was called to protest the administration's intention to privatize the company.

Another problem facing STENEE is the configuration of a "parallel" board of directors, which according to Lanza will have to be submitted to the assembly for approval, "because it is the only organ of election."

In a communique issued on 1 January, STENEE announced the end of the labor problem based on the fact that negotiations were to begin on 2 January.

New 105th Brigade Commander Assumes Command

PA0401130092 San Pedro Sula LA PRENSA in Spanish 27 Dec 92 p 2

[Text] San Pedro Sula—Colonel Inocente Borjas Santos, who had served as commander of the 12th Infantry Battalion stationed in Santa Rosa de Copan, on 26

December assumed command of the 105th Military Brigade. He said: "I come here full of determination to serve and cooperate and to preserve the trust the people have in its armed forces."

Outgoing commander Col. Julio Armando Pavon Rodriguez, who served in the 105th Military Brigade for the past 14 months, was appointed secretary general-adviser to Luis Alonso Discua Elvir, armed forces commander in chief. This new post was created within the structure of the military institute.

The change of command ceremony, which took place 26 December in the 105th Brigade's Heroes Square in San Pedro Sula, was presided over by Army General Commander Jose Banegas Medina, who gave special recognition to Pavon Rodriguez for his outstanding work at that military unit and for helping to bring harmony and to solve several labor-management and community problems and problems involving peasants.

In his speech Borjas Santos expressed his firm determination to cooperate "with everthing that benefits our fellow citizens; and to help reach their goals the honest people who struggle day after day to achieve better social and economic conditions within the framework of the law and moral values."

"Leading a great unit entails responsibility and more so when it is located in a strong economic area that is highly productive and has enormous human potential," Borjas Santos said. He added that principles and ideas must guide the activities of the 105th Brigade and of each and every unit, command, and branch that comprise the 2d Military Region.

Borjas Santos pointed out that this is why he needs the full cooperation of groups and associations and of all members of productive society in the northwestern zone to carry out his mission in the new position assigned him by the high command. He added that the 105th Brigade is ready to heed the call of the people.

Pavon Rodriguez said he accepted a challenge when he assumed command of the 105th Military Brigade 14 months ago. He added that, modesty apart, "I fulfilled my mission very well." Pavon Rodriguez said that commanding the 105th Brigade does not involve only military work. It reaches other areas such as labor-management and community problems and problems involving peasants.

When questioned by reporters after the change of command ceremony, Pavon Rodriguez pointed out that he is satisfied with his appointment as secretary general-adviser to the commander in chief of the armed forces.

Answering a question as to whether he believes his new appointment is a demotion in his military career, Pavon Rodriguez said that in the armed forces "no change is a demotion."

Nicaragua

Recompas Kidnap 10 Former Resistance Members

PA0601162392 Managua Radio Nicaragua Network in Spanish 1200 GMT 6 Jan 92

[Excerpts] Lino Hernandez Trigueros, executive secretary of the Permanent Human Rights Commission, CPDH, has reported the kidnapping and murder of a demobilized member of the Nicaraguan Resistance [RN].

In a statement to Radio Nicaragua, Hernandez Trigueros blamed one of the armed groups known as recompas operating in the northern region for the murder of former RN member Pedro Pablo Laguna.

[Begin Hernandez recording] Nery Marquiz Perez and Reynaldo Diaz Sanchez went to the CPDH offices during the recent holidays.They are community leaders of a development area known as Las Plachuelas, which is located in Rio Escondido, east of Ciudad Rama.They reported that at approximately 1830 on 17 December some 40 armed men who identified themselves as recompas arrived at a farm known as La Chalmemca. The farm is currently in the hands of RN members; it was delivered to them in compliance with agreements signed between the government and the RN. The armed men kidnapped 10 former RN members, including Hilario Perez, Luis Real Alvarez, Mercedes Amador, Santana Urbina, Damian Herrera, Matilde Sarablanca, Federico Laguna, Julio Laguna, and Pedro Pablo Laguna. The latter, Pedro Pablo, 16, was found dead in a river three days later. [passage omitted]

It is important to note that those who reported the case to the CPDH mentioned the names of individuals who were supposedly responsible for the action; they were reportedly identified by members of the community. One of them is Marcos Sanchez, a former lieutenant in the Sandinist People's Army [EPS], who is called the head of this rearmed group. They also mentioned former EPS lieutenants Domingo Somoza, Manuel Velasquez, Victorino Cardoze, militant of the Sandinist National Liberation Front, and former EPS member Damaso Martinez and his sons Ismael and Marvin Martinez. [end recording]

Solidarity With Cuba Committee President Named

PA0501042192 Managua Sistema Nacional de Television Network in Spanish 0330 GMT 3 Jan 92

[Text] Priest Miguel D'Escoto [former Sandinist foreign minister] has been chosen to head the Nicaraguan Solidarity With Cuba Committee [Comite Nicaraguense de Solidaridad con Cuba]. The committee is an organization without political, religious, or social distinctions. It was established to help the Cuban people confront their current difficulties caused by the lack of petroleum.

[Begin committee member Melania Vega recording] We will start a national campaign to exert direct pressure on Venezuela and Mexico, as these are the countries that should supply petroleum to Cuba. [end recording]

Priest Miguel D'Escoto Brockmann is president of the Solidarity With Cuba Committee.

[Begin Vega recording] In the framework of the 33d anniversary of the Cuban revolution, we have chosen Father Miguel D'Escoto Brockmann as president of our committee. Our committee will strengthen the A Drop of Petroleum campaign with concrete actions and in an objective manner. [end recording]

It has been reported that 250 members of the third region in Managua will commemorate the 33d anniversary of the Cuban revolution on 4 January.

Officials Discuss Revolutionary Movements' Future

PA0401201692 Managua Radio Sandino in Spanish 1300 GMT 29 Dec 91

[Roundtable with Jacinto Suarez, first Nicaraguan ambassador to the USSR; Isidro Tellez, secretary general of the Marxist-Leninist People's Action Movement, MAP-ML; Onofre Guevara, delegate of the Sandinist National Liberation Front, FSLN; and unidentified reporter]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Reporter] We have Comrade Isidro Tellez, secretary general of the Marxist-Leninist People's Action Movement [MAP-ML]. Isidro, I do not know how you feel about all the events that have occurred. I remember when we called you extremists! [laughs] Your party, which was an anti-Soviet party—why not mention it—was generally considered an extreme-left or extreme-leftist party. Right, Isidro? How do you feel now that it seems your thesis was valid?

[Tellez] Well, yes. When we first became active in 1982 we denied the existence of socialism in the Soviet Union. We felt at the time that socialism had been misconstrued because the working class had lost its political power and it had been replaced by a clique, a group of persons who had misconstrued Lenin's work.

It is logical that, at this point... [pauses] 19 years have passed, and we have seen the collapse of socialism and the end of its influence on certain people and parties that were pro-Soviet and depended on the Soviet Union. This has naturally been a harsh blow to these groups, the so-called traditional groups, the sacred cows. [laughter] The blow has been quite hard and, although we have nothing to do with the CPSU, the events have nevertheless had repercussions in the revolutionary movement.

[Reporter] Whatever is left of the revolutionary movement.

[Tellez] Yes. There has been no... [pauses] there was no discussion or investigation, and no alternative was sought to what the Soviets had been doing. We... [pauses] when you say that we were extremists, it means that we did not recognize the parent parties, the older parties.

[Reporter] Mother Russia. [laughter]

[Tellez] Mother Russia, Mother China, Mother Cuba—whatever. That is not the issue. The relationship between Marxist-Leninist parties, meaning the ones with the same ideology, must be from one party to another. In other words, it must be based on respect and mutual support rather than on conditions. We think the Soviet Union was evidently playing a counterrevolutionary role in recent years. In fact, the Soviet Union and U.S. imperialism played an equally important role in Nicaragua, exerting pressure on the Nicaraguan revolution so it would grind to a stop and become paralyzed.

[Reporter] That is what I wanted to discuss with Jacinto. I have some questions, and I hope you do not think I am quixotic. When you talk about the USSR's disappearance, does it entail its disappearance as a structure or as an organization? I think it only entails the disappearance of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Do you follow me? Jacinto, the development of a person's mind is such a difficult process that it would be interesting to discuss the issue. Transnationals, members of the international bourgeoisie, are trying to sell the idea that this is a mechanical, automatic fact. In othe. words, Marxism-Leninism has disappeared from the world as a concept. This is what causes concern because we understand that what is formed in a person's mind is a product of a long and difficult process; it will not disappear by magic. No one can wave a wand and erase the minds of millions and millions of people who struggled for this cause for 70 years. Jacinto, what do you think?

[Suarez] Look, if we analyze history we will realize that a Bolshevik revolution was possible thanks to the revolutionaries. What I mean is that the phenomenon of a revolutionary mind does not depend on a revolution. Revolutionaries are the result of social and political conditions, meaning class differences. What Isidro said is important. We must realize that we have a problem: We do not have a point of reference in the world. In other words, the Soviet model was an important point of reference for the whole world. All leftists—this includes a vast array of people, including Buddhist revolutionaries, Christian revolutionaries, and all kinds of Marxists-Leninists—had an important reference point in the USSR. We copied what we thought was good about this society, and we rejected what we thought was bad.

[Reporter] Do remember Ricardo's [not further identified] phra We must be Marxists as well as Nicaraguans? Do remember that?

[Suarez] He said we had to read Marxism as Nicaraguans.

[Reporter] Correct.

[Suarez] Well, the loss of a reference point logically creates a problem for all revolutionaries. We may have different views and attitudes, but we are all revolutionaries who strive for social change. Well, this calls for a discussion and a search for other alternatives and models. This logically affects the development of revolutionary forces throughout the world. There should be no doubt about it, there should be no doubt about it [repeats]. Well, the debate has just begun. It is the search

for a new option. If you stop and consider things you will realize that perestroyka even destroyed ethical values. It destroyed them!

[Reporter] Which ones, for example?

[Suarez] Look, that country was proud of its nationality and its history, meaning that being a war hero was very important in that country. Nevertheless, during perestroyka....[pauses] I left the country in 1985, but I went to the USSR practically every year. I was even there in 1991, so I have an idea about the way things happened, the way things changed. In the end, being a war hero was tantamount to nothing. Positions were similar to the ones adopted here, meaning that things were difficult.

So what happened? A scale of values was disrupted; a scale of values was destroyed; and there was no replacement, there was no replacement. [repeats] You did not find.... [pauses] I know millions of comrades—because I lived there many years—who were suddenly left without a goal, without a sense of direction. They were in anguish because their world had collapsed and they had no reference point to create a world, a new scale of values, a new system of ethics. War heroes who were formerly respected and loved in that country had become nothing.

[Reporter] [Words indistinct] large number of military uniforms and the people's deep respect was evident. I visited the Soviet Union in 1981, and I was impressed by the way in which the people respected—almost like a religion—the heroes of the homeland who had fought in what was called the big war. What you say is interesting because we have been told that these same people are now living like beggars. They are living like beggars because the state has stopped paying their pensions or they have lost certain privileges and prerogatives.

We must continue with the roundtable. Isidro, what is the outlook? What alternative do you see concerning the creation of a new leftist model in Latin America? I want to review Orlando Nunez' thesis. I do not know if you read Orlando's interesting article in BARRICADA. I saw that he affectionately talked about you [words indistinct]. Orlando said that political parties, including yours, have been surpassed by mass movements and social movements that have arisen outside political parties. In your opinion, what is the outlook for Latin American leftists, considering all the social, ecological, and feminist movements?

[Tellez] I think Suarez is right. We are living in what is apparently a unipolar world, meaning that the Soviet Union's differences with the United States no longer.... [pauses] We thought that they were differences, but they were essentially the result of a process; they were a tactic. Nevertheless, those differences do exist for us. There is a difference of classes, meaning that poverty levels are even worse. Capital increasingly tends to concentrate in the hands of a few, and poverty has increased enormously. We are no longer in 1917, we are about to begin 1992, yet the world lives in extreme poverty, and the struggle is evident every day.

Poverty levels have increased in Nicaragua, no matter what the president says, no matter how much she wants to hide the truth. In other words, thousands upon thousands of workers are unemployed and they need a job; and those who have a job earn a miserable salary. The same goes for Latin America, Caracas. Carlos Andres Perez, the champion of democracy, has had to face two movements, two crises in Caracas. The workers, the masses, the popular sectors demand solutions and are struggling for their rights. This creates the conditions for a revolution and worsens contradictions between the poor and the rich, the exploited and the exploiters. We are logically facing a situation in which revolutionary forces—meaning Latin American revolutionaries—have somehow gotten off course.

[Reporter] They are facing a crisis.

[Tellez] They are facing a crisis and have opted for a negotiation process. This happened in El Salvador, Colombia, etc. We see this option has been chosen by these movements because they did not find a solution, an alternative. Nevertheless, we bselieve the negotiation processes, the negotiations, are not decisive because they will not solve the critical problems faced by the people.

We believe the outlook for Latin America's revolutionary movements is to continue the people's struggle against capitalism and imperialism. However, we endorse democratic dialogue processes. We think Nicaraguan revolutionaries must organize forums and discussions that enable us to find alternatives and present proposals so the masses and the workers may recover their confidence after so many false movements. [passage omitted]

Business Leader on Production, Political Situation

PA0601035892

[Editorial Report] Managua Radio Catolica in Spanish at 1130 GMT on 3 January 1992 carries a 17-minute report on exclusive statements by Enrique Bolanos, leader of the Higher Council of Private Enterprise. Bolanos says: "In 1979 Nicaragua exported $650 million. After 11 years of barbarian rule, our exports were reduced to $300 million. Two years after the new government took office we continue to export $300 million. The difference now is that we have large amounts of supplies, thanks to our European cousins, who give us a few cents, and our rich uncle, who supports us."

Bolanos says that if Nicaraguans do not produce, the United States will not continue to give them the money they require and consequently the future will be very bleak. He states that in the past two years not much has changed in Nicaragua, and in the past year Sandinist domination has grown. The four branches of government are dominated by Sandinists, he says.

Speaking about cotton production, Bolanos says that during its 11-year regime the Sandinist National Liberation Front, FSLN, paid what it pleased for the cotton

crop. He adds that Nicaragua is mainly an agricultural country and "based on what I observe, see, and hear, I can say that we do not have a coherent agriculture policy to face the future. Two years have passed and we are still producing fewer agricultural products than before. This shows that we are not on the right track." Bolanos adds that cotton planting has dropped from 300,000 manzanas to a meager 50,000 manzanas. He believes cotton producers are planting less because cotton is grown at a loss. He says: "This is occurring with the best crop in the country. Can you imagine what is happening to the rest of the country's crops?"

Speaking of the country's political situation, Bolanos says he believes the government is controlled by Sandinists. He says: "Nothing has changed, although we held elections and a new government was sworn in. Sandinists continue to be in power." Bolanos notes that the current government has been able to get money from international sources but has unfortunately used it to promote consumption and not to stimulate production. "I went to the supermarket the other day and 80 or 90 percent of the merchandise I saw was imported," he says. He adds: "Who pays for this? Well, this is paid for by the rich uncle. The government has been good at scratching the rich uncle's belly and taking his money. However, this government has not been able to make the country produce more."

An unidentified correspondent asks Bolanos if he means that the rich uncle approves of the Chamorro-Sandinist alliance. He answers: "Yes, I would say so. However, this is unimportant because the rich uncle acts according to his interests." Bolanos continues: "The United States follows policies that work in its favor. It is not looking out for us because that is our responsibility. The United States can get along with General Ortega just as it did with Somoza. The United States says: He is an SOB, but he is our SOB." The correspondent asks Bolanos why he believes the State Department does not interfere with the Chamorro-Sandinist alliance and if he believes the alliance is the first step in Antonio Lacayo's presidential candidacy. He answers: "I do not want to go that far. However, I definitely believe the U.S. State Department and Government basically agree with what is happening and continue to finance this project, with or without the candidacy of Antonio Lacayo. I would not be surprised if it backs Humberto Ortega. I would say the United States already feels very comfortable with Gen. Ortega."

* Commentaries Discuss Corruption Charges

* Inaction Criticized

92CA0056A Managua BARRICADA in Spanish
7 Nov 91 p 3

[Article by Orlando Gomez]

[Text] With all the cases of corruption in state institutions, we, the Nicaraguan people, do not know whether to disregard the anecdotal reports we hear, or resign ourselves to swallowing these abuses like bitter medicine.

This corruption reaches into all areas of life, both business and political life. The hundreds of thousands of dollars spent on political campaigns, coming from the agency for international destabilization, is barely the tip of the iceberg that we are beginning to see.

The Office of the General Comptroller of the Republic was called to the National Assembly to report on administrative corruption, and the list which this organization presented was pathetic. There are so many shady actions in the handling of public affairs that no business activity in the hands of the state escapes. The Comptroller's office said they were unable to investigate many other cases because of insufficient budget resources.

In any event, the situation of the Comptroller's office, unable to fully perform its duties, while the comptroller himself recently said that not everything the media says about corruption is true, leads us to think that we are facing an impasse in our future.

Comptroller's Office Not in Control

So it comes as no surprise to us that a top official of the PSD [Democratic Social Party]—also the Comptroller of the Republic—has not decided on or recommended any action against the manager of a basic foods distribution company, who is said to be working on behalf of another top PSD official to whom the Comptroller is particularly indebted, and who happens to be the head of the legislative branch.

They are playing games with us, because what the Comptroller's Office does is take action when fraudulent operations have taken place. This agency performs an accounting, investigation process which may take days, weeks, or months. The Comptroller's Office is not a political body, although it may be used as a political instrument.

As things stand now, we find lethargy on the part of the Executive to act. If a specific official belonging to the area of influence of the head of the legislature is removed, the head of the legislature, through the appropriate Assembly committee, may do the same with corrupt officials in the area of influence of the Executive and vice versa, in a neverending cycle.

So at the present time, the Nicaraguan people will have to keep on swallowing the fiction that "things are done honestly in Nicaragua," while government officials are working to "build their future" in the shortest possible period of time: six years.

* UNO Factions Viewed

92CA0056B Managua BARRICADA in Spanish
26 Nov 91 p 3

[Article by Oscar Rene Vargas [1]]

[Text] In my book entitled "Where Is Nicaragua Going" published in February 1991, in describing the present government, I made the following statement on page 69: "The political phase which is opening includes the possibility of a confused jumble of noisy contradictions: UNO [National Opposition Union] members conspiring with the Chamorro Government; Sandinists supporting Chamorro; Chamorro having to maintain a formal duality of powers in order to paralyze the far right and ex-Somozists and draw support from the Sandinist movement...."

Now, 20 months into Mrs. Chamorro's administration, the political struggle between different UNO factions has grown more intense, and charges of corruption and abuses by government officials belonging to different factions are appearing publicly, in order to put pressure on the Executive so as not to lose out in the coming government restructuring, and at the same time to weaken the rival faction.

First, there were the strong charges against top Aeronica officials (belonging to Alfredo Cesar's faction); then there was the charge about passports involving Ministry of Finance officials (belonging to Antonio Lacayo's group); later there were charges against the vice minister of finance and other officials about allowing merchandise to enter without paying taxes; in response Yelba Carvajal (first connected with Virgilio Godoy's faction and now with Cesar) was accused of tax fraud; and finally, there is the battle between the "vices," which the communications media have (erroneously) nicknamed "chicken-gate."

The arguments and charges between Noel Vidaurre Arguello and Antonio Ibarra Rojas have a deep political content which began in April 1991. Making use of Antonio Lacayo's trip to Venezuela, Alfredo Cesar and Carlos Hurtado put pressure on the president to order the removal of Rene Vivas as head of the National Police. The intervention of Ibarra Rojas (from Cesar and Hurtado's party) prevented this from happening, averting a much more serious political crisis.

Later Antonio Ibarra Rojas, in statements to "El Semanario", launched Antonio Lacayo's candidacy for the 1996 elections; this disturbed the PSD's [Democratic Social Party] political leadership. The PSD countered by publishing a document criticizing Antonio Lacayo's policy of alliances; in an unusual move, this statement was signed by all the PSD members holding high-level offices in the government, including Ibarra Rojas, who said he had not been consulted about the content of the document.

The Center Group

Nevertheless, the factor which actually led to the break between Alfredo Cesar's faction and Antonio Ibarra Rojas was Ibarra Rojas's attempt to destroy Cesar's absolute hegemony over the UNO deputies, and to initiate the formation of what might be called a centrist parliamentary group—in agreement with the FSLN's [Sandinist National Liberation Front] coalition policy promoted by Antonio Lacayo.

At the same time, there arose the chicken problem involving a nephew of Ibarra Rojas and the interests of the vice minister of the economy. This dispute was used by the Cesar faction to try to get Antonio Ibarra Rojas, a candidate to replace Hurtado Cabrera in the Ministry of Government, out of the political picture. By appointing Ibarra Rojas to head the Government Ministry, the Executive may be trying to gain better control of the municipal leaders movement favorable to the line of Vice President Virgilio Godoy.

The most serious accusation which Vidaurre made against Ibarra Rojas is the improper use of $8,000. Vidaurre did not explain how he obtained photocopies of those documents, nor did he say how the money was used. However, it is known that some UNO deputies' "support" was obtained through "a few dollars." That is why the vice minister of the presidency has to keep quiet. Possibly, knowing that fact, the Cesar faction used Vidaurre to gain advantage in this case over the other factions and at the same time to sacrifice one of the reasons behind Cesar's weakness in the National Assembly.

All of this demonstrates the heating up of the struggle between the various factions to gain political dominance, given the almost certain replacement of a good number of ministers and diplomatic corps members. The minister of the presidency now faces the challenge of giving coherence to the Executive, by eliminating those who have consistently torpedoed its coalition policy.

The Cesar faction decided nearly six months ago to take the offensive against Lacayo. The latest events demonstrate a fairly profound split, suggesting that the minister of the presidency has to bring order to the Executive and establish new alliances with the parties represented in the National Assembly, ultimately weakening his own president.

So far, the alliances which have been established have not been respected. For example, the National Conservative Party has three ministers in the cabinet, and four of its five deputies voted against the Executive's policy. We can say the same of the Democratic Party of National Confidence, some of whose leaders are in the diplomatic corps. And the same could be added of other political parties belonging to UNO.

Based on that experience, the Executive is now inclined to name the next cabinet based on clearer and more reliable political alliances, in order to consolidate a centrist parliamentary group which, working in coalition with the FSLN, would produce a presidential majority.

Footnotes 1. Author of the following books: *"The Crisis of Dictatorship"* (1978); *"Elections in Nicaragua: Socio-Political Analysis"* (1989); *"The U.S. Intervention and Its Consequences: Nicaragua, 1910-1925"* (1989); *"Political Parties and the Search for a New Model"* (1990); and *"Where Is Nicaragua Going"* (1991).

• FSLN Charges Exaggerated

92CA0056C Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish 27 Nov 91 p 4

[Article by Luis Sanchez Sancho]

[Text] The UNO [National Opposition Union] government program included a definite commitment, made by the 14 parties which were members of the democratic coalition, to fight against the government corruption which characterized both the Somozist and Sandinist dictatorships, and which had demoralized Nicaragua's public administration.

"The National Salvation Government intends to create a dynamic, honest, and efficient public administration," states the UNO Government Program. It cited as an urgent task for the new government, the eradication "without hesitation of embezzlement, fraud, abuses, disorders, bureaucratic red tape, and deficiencies in state agencies."

Violeta de Chamorro summarized the UNO coalition's major objectives in terms of public administration with her personal pledge to promote a Revolution of Honesty from her office as president of the republic.

The promises made by UNO and Dona Violeta to clean up the government were inspired by unassailable reasons.

The Sandinist regime had caused a painful and bloody civil war which was aggravated by foreign intervention aiding the two warring sides: it deeply divided the nation with its odious and intolerant ideology and political practices. It ruined the national economy, converted the country into an international beggar, and imposed a degrading rationing system on the nation.

In addition, the Sandinist regime institutionalized government corruption, bringing it to levels only exceeded by itself during the "Pinata" it conducted with property belonging to the nation and to private individuals, during the government transition period from February to April 1990.

Of course, government corruption was also a trademark of the Somozist regime. The two authoritarian regimes which Nicaragua has suffered under from the 1930's to the 1980's perfected the practice of state-sponsored looting. That is why UNO's and Dona Violeta's promise to clean up the public administration and the exercise of government was so clear, and was so well received by the population.

Now, 19 months after the inauguration of President Chamorro's administration, what has happened to that promise to promote the Revolution of Honesty?

If we were to credit what the Sandinist media say, we would believe that the president has forgotten that promise, that the cure has been worse that the disease because the government of democracy is more corrupt than the authoritarian Sandinist or Somozist regime, or in the best of cases, that Dona Violeta's good intentions were shattered by the stubborn reality of a corrupt and incorrigible society.

But the Revolution of Honesty has not failed; nor has it been forgotten; nor was it only campaign rhetoric.

It can not be denied that there is corruption in the public administration, especially at middle and lower levels. Still, the great majority of the Sandinist charges are exaggerated and are part of their propaganda strategy, because the Sandinists want to counter the devastating effect that a national debate on the "Pinata" and the Property Law would have on them.

The Sandinist "Pinata" was not a matter of propaganda, speculation, or suspicion, and was certainly not bad faith against the political leaders removed from office by democracy. The "Pinata" refers to specific undeniable deeds: the hundreds of companies that were fraudulently plundered or transferred; the thousands of properties usurped and laundered through "questionable laws"; the tens of thousands of "manzanas" of the best cultivated and cultivable lands, which went to new landowners in the guise of agrarian reform; the millions and milions of dollars drained from bank accounts, the large debts forgiven, the machinery that disappeared, etc.

At the same time, with the propaganda of their numerous communications media gained through the "Pinata," Sandinism is attempting to discredit and demoralize the democratic government, to sow discord and distrust among the new officials.

In the new democratic system's public administration, there are cases of corruption for two fundamental reasons. One is that the major part of the bureaucratic apparatus is the same as in the former government. There are even institutions which have not changed anything or which have made very few changes, because the Sandinists have not allowed them to change, and that is why they promote disturbances like those which took place in July of last year and on 9 November 1991. And the other reason is that abuses, corruption, and arrivism are human failings which occur in all systems, governments, and parties.

The Revolution of Honesty consists, first of all, in not covering up or protecting corruption, as happened during the dictatorships.

Under this new democratic government abuses are reported, prosecuted, and to the extent possible, they are punished.

The Revolution of Honesty not only brings into the light of day the inevitable cases of corruption and abuses, but it even tolerates having some communications media

turned over to the Sandinists by the "Pinata" defame, invent, and distort the facts to harm the new government's image.

The Revolution of Honesty is functioning in ways which are simple now, but which were unheard of before; for example, the president of the Republic continues to live as she did before, and she has not increased any of her property since she took office. And when Dona Violeta ends her term in office, she will continue to live in her old family house, with the same or a smaller fortune than when she took office.

Under the former regime, high-level officials took office wearing rags, but they left as millionaires. And look at where and how they live now, in other people's mansions which by magic became their property.

Panama

Russia, Other Republics, CIS Recognized

PA0301204892 Panama City LA ESTRELLA DE PANAMA in Spanish 3 Jan 92 p A-2

[Executive Decree No. 1 of 2 January 1992]

[Text] Executive Decree No. 1 (of 2 January 1992) recognizing the legal existence of the Russian Federation, the other nine republics, and the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS].

The president of the Republic, in exercising his legal powers,
Whereas:

The USSR has ceased to exist as a legal-political entity.
The presidents of the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation, and the Republic of Ukraine met on 8 December 1991 in the city of Minsk to create, as sovereign states, the CIS.
The Republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenia, and Uzbekistan have joined the CIS.
The CIS Council of Heads of State decided that the Russian Federation will replace the USSR at the United Nations.

Decrees:
Article 1: Recognize the Russian Federation; the Republics of Azerbaijan; Armenia; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Moldova; Tajikistan; Turkmenia; and Uzbekistan as independent and sovereign states.
Article 2: Likewise recognize the CIS, formally constituted by the Minsk Agreement of 8 December and its 21 December 1991 Protocol.

Be it promulgated and published

Issued in Panama City on 2 January 1992
[Signed] Guillermo Endara Galimany, president of the Republic;
Julio Linares, Minister of Foreign Relations

Foreign Minister Discusses U.S. Military Bases

PA0701012592 Panama City LA ESTRELLA DE PANAMA in Spanish 5 Jan 91 p c-5

[Article by Foreign Minister Julio Linares: "Reflections on the Military Bases"]

[Text] The rights bequeathed to the United States of America under the Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty regarding the use of Panama's land and naval forces, the establishment of fortifications for the security and protection of the Panama Canal and the vessels that transit it, and the use of the railroad and other facilities, was of a temporary nature. Now such fortifications should not be mistaken for military bases. The former are merely defensive installations, while the latter may be either defensive or offensive. Nevertheless, the United States arbitrarily installed 14 military bases of every kind, including air bases in the Canal Zone. That was a very arbitrary action when we consider that when the treaty was signed, those types of bases did not exist. Therefore, it was not possible to justify—as much as they wanted to bend the rules of hermeneutics—that Panama had authorized the United States to establish such bases. Furthermore, Article XXVIII of said treaty only refers to land and naval forces; nowhere does it mention air forces.

The worst part of it was that the bases did not respond exclusively to the security and protection of the canal, that is, the objectives they should have followed according to the treaty, had they been legally established. They were responding, more than anything else, to the security and the defense of the continent, particularly the United States. For this reason, without any right whatsoever, they also set up the Southern Command in the Canal Zone, the jurisdiction that includes Central and South America.

I began these reflections by commenting on events that occurred under treaty constraints that ended more than 11 years ago. Several countries have, or have had, foreign military bases on their lands without experiencing an affront to their sovereignty, independence, dignity, or the respect of their citizens. It occurs when the establishment of such bases has been in response to a free will gesture of the state where they are located and when a series of political, social, and economic issues have been considered.

In Panama, as we were able to see, events took a different turn. The 14 military bases located in the Canal Zone were simply the product of an imposition of the law of the strongest, in which neither our country's will nor its essential interests were considered. Therefore, apart from the annual payment Panama received as compensation for the rights, powers, and privileges granted to the United States—that did not include the right to establish military bases in the Canal Zone—the United States did not pay a single cent to Panama for establishing those bases. Panama had to put up with having the richest nation maintain military bases on Panamanian territory to safeguard the continent's security, including the United Stated's security, without receiving any economic compensation.

The foregoing has caused a strong aversion in many Panamanians—that is easily explainable, by the way—to anything related to the establishment or permanence of U.S. military bases in Panama. Therefore, the dismantling of the bases has become a real and legitimate objective. Furthermore, speaking or even thinking of foreign military bases on our territory is taboo for many, despite the fact that the establishment of bases is not humiliating or shameful in itself. What could be humiliating and shameful is the manner in which they are established and the terms and conditions that regulate them if they are not orthodox. Although this could be considered a truism, we must bear in mind whether we want to keep prejudices from fogging our decisions

The strong aversion many Panamanians have to anything concerning the establishment or continuation of U.S. military bases in Panama is not, however, the only distortion of facts that exists. The role of warrantor the United States has played in Panama, even before our independence—we could go back to the Mallarino-Bidlack Treaty the new Granada signed with the United States on 12 December 1846—has led some people to believe that our country could never do without U.S. presence. In their opinion, unfortunately, we are incapable of doing anything without U.S. tutelage. Incredibly enough, based on this concept of "the Panamanians' obvious inability," a few months ago a young businessman stressed to me the need to maintain U.S. military bases in Panama beyond 2000, even if we are not paid a cent for them. According to him, we can consider ourselves well paid with the employment and economic benefits derived from that presence.

Those who believe so should realize that a nation that permanently needs foreign tutelage is doomed to disappear, and that therefore we must learn to stand on our own feet. In addition, a particular mental attitude has led them to exaggerate the value of positive aspects in our relations with the United States and to underestimate the negative aspects that many of them ignore. For them, the sanitation of the cities of Panama and Colon by the United States was a colossal job that Panamanians could have never accomplished. On the other hand, however, if they are aware of it, they give no importance to the fact that, frankly speaking, the United States did not pay a cent for the Canal Zone or the Panama Canal before 1955, except for the $10 million paid during the exchange of ratifications of the Hay-Buneau-Varilla Treaty. The annuity they paid us was the same amount they owed us for the railroad concession.

There is also another aspect. In addition to the feeling of inability, some have been overcome by apprehension and fear, convinced that without U.S. presence Panama could fall again under a dictatorship similar to or worse than the one that subjugated us for 21 years. The truth is, however, that the respect we Panamanians have for our institutions and our determination to defend them, regardless of whom the president may be, is what will most likely save us from a tyrannical government. The firm and courageous attitude of the Russian people during the attempted coup d'etat against President Mikhail Gorbachev should be an example for us. It is also true that until the latter part of 1987 the United States helped to consolidate and maintain the dictatorship in Panama, and that therefore we must stop depending on others. I am not the only one who believes this. A bipartisan delegation from the U.S. Senate that visited Panama from 12 to 16 November 1987 openly admitted this. In its report about our country, the delegation stated that "U.S. policy toward the Panamanian Government and the Panama Defense Forces [FDP] has been one of support and cooperation since 1968," and hence the "20 years of close links between the United States and Panamanian military leaders have been severely criticized by the opposition leaders, who feel that the FDP domain over Panamanian politics and government has been tacitly, if not publicly, approved by successive administrations in Washington."

We must be aware that Panama will never have the military capacity to defend the canal, in the event that any state with the necessary potential should decide to carry out a missile and rocket attack against us. The U.S. military action of 20 December 1989 proved this. It is a fact, no matter how much money we spend in arming or militarizing our country. This, by the way, would be a grave mistake, because in addition to increasing the odds of falling into another dictatorship, it would be senseless to live for the canal, instead of using it for our benefit as a means for our economic and social development and for rain raising our people's standard of living. The people's wisdom lies in recognizing their limitations and acting accordingly. Not recognizing them, or pretending not to, can be disastrous in the long run.

Given that Panama lacks the military capacity to defend the Canal, it is not surprising that we Panamanians see the neutrality of this waterway as a means of assuring its safety, through diplomatic and legal channels. The goal of the neutrality of a state, an area, or a navigable waterway (river, channel, straight) is solely to secure the benefits of peace, even in times of war, in exchange for certain restrictions to actions in the neutral state or in the territory where the neutral area or navigable waterway is located.

The new Panama Canal Treaty will end at noon, Panama time, on 31 December 1999. The outcome of this event will be that the Republic of Panama will administer the Canal and all of the reverted real estate, including the military bases, used until now by the United States for the objectives of the Treaty. The fact that the United States has started to reduce its military presence in Panama—as it is doing in other nations—has prompted Local 907, formed by employees who work on those bases, to demand that the government negotiate for the bases to remain after 2000. The workers argue in favor of such negotiations because closing the bases will mean the loss of over 5,000 jobs from the workforce, and because

these bases have influence in our weak economy. Meanwhile, legislator Leo Gonzalez has taken up this negotiation as a crusade. He takes advantage of every opportunity in an attempt to force the government to initiate these negotiations.

Without at this point going into the convenience or inconvenience of signing a military base treaty, the national government has made the decision not to negotiate during this administration, as it considers that this is not the most propitious time. Therefore:

a) To be in a position to obtain greater benefits for the nation, the negotiation of a military bases treaty must be carried out within an acceptable climate of political, social, and economic stability so that a state of uncertainty does not force us to surrender on issues that can be fundamental. However, we Panamanians, instead of making an effort to reconstruct our nation in the shortest time possible, seem to be bent on destroying it.

b) Unless specific considerations move the Unites States to make an exception with Panama—an exception that is not seen anywhere near short- or medium-term, given the East-West dissention that fortunately is resulting in the reduction of the Defense Department budget—the U.S. policy tends to reduce its military presence in various parts of the world. This policy lead to the assertion that the closing or different use of 150 bases in their own territory would represent for them the loss of 34,000 jobs.

c) The U.S. Government, whether for tactical, strategic, budget, or of any reason whatsoever, to date has not shown any interest in negotiating a military bases treaty. Faced with this reality, it is absurd to assume—as some appear to believe—that the U.S. Government is currently willing to pay Panama the millions it pays to Spain and the Philippines, for example, for the bases established in their territories. "Supply and demand" relations hold true in this case, as in all cases. The more we insist on negotiating—even worse, if the Panamanian people vote in favor of this negotiation in a plebiscite—the more we will reduce the value of our supply—that is, the value of those bases.

d) The national government currently does not count on facts to formulate an opinion that indicates in a serious and responsible fashion that the immediate signing of a military bases treaty is a better alternative than incorporating those bases into the overall development of the nation, as upheld by planners and developers. The fact that over 5,000 people will lose their jobs has been common knowledge since 17 September 1977, more than 13 years ago. Therefore, to insist in a negotiation under the current unfavorable conditions, when we still have eight years to go before the bases revert to Panama, or to negotiate because the U.S. Congress compels its government to do so, could result in the greatest historical error we could ever commit, an error that certainly would influence the results of the negotiations.

e) Because of what the foreign military bases represent for the country in which they are located (risk of an attack, jurisdictional limitations, coexistence, etc.), the bases should create relations of solidarity and not of conflict. To prevent the treaty authorizing the bases from becoming a source of controversy and disagreement, the treaty should be free of anything that might lead people to think that the treaty was imposed. The controversies and disagreements resulting from the way in which the Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty was signed should serve as a warning.

A Legislative Assembly delegation traveled to the United States in July. Before leaving, legislator Leo Gonzalez told the media: "As members of the Legislative Assembly who are concerned over the fate of the people working at the military bases, we are going to the United States in an effort to persuade the U.S. Government to leave its forces here after 2000 and to pressure President Endara to negotiate a new treaty on military bases after that date." The other delegates did not support that remark. Days later, on 25 July, the U.S. Senate approved Bill S-1435 that reads: "Congress feels the President should: (1) negotiate a new agreement with the Panamanian Government on the rights for bases in Panama; the treaty should permit the permanent stationing of U.S. military bases in Panama beyond 31 December 1999; and (2) consult with Congress during the negotiations described in Paragraph (1)."

Although the Panamanian Embassy in Washington has reported that Bill S-1435 is not obligatory, I deemed it proper to send U.S. Ambassador to Panama Deane Hinton Note D.M. 599 of 26 July, in which the Foreign Ministry affirms that Panama, during the current administration, does not view as timely any negotiations on a new agreement for U.S. military forces to remain in our territory beyond 31 December 1999. In his reply, dated 6 August, Ambassador Hinton in turn affirmed his government's determination "to honor and abide by the letter and spirit of the Panama Canal Treaties." He confirmed that the bill under discussion was not intended to be "a directive from the legislative to the executive," and that "it should not be interpreted in that way either."

Finally, military experts agree that the Panama Canal cannot be defended from military bases or defense sites in our territory, if it becomes necessary to face attacks conducted with the advanced and sophisticated military means now in use. Hence, although they stay in our territory beyond 2000, with the excuse that they serve to defend the Panama Canal, their true purpose is to defend areas other than the Panama Canal. This is important, because in a war emergency the military bases established in our territory could well turn us into military objectives for reasons unrelated to the Panama Canal. In case of war, military objectives are the first ones attacked. They turn the country in which these objectives are located into a battlefield. These factors should also be weighed when considering the possibility of negotiating a treaty on bases, instead of limiting the debate to the 5,000 workers who unfortunately will be left without

jobs when the bases close and to what the presence of the bases represents for our weak economy. These things seem to be the only ones of concern to some people.

Noriega Defense Attorney Requests Endara's Help

PA0601185092 Panama City EL PANAMA AMERICA in Spanish 6 Jan 92 p 1

[Report by Juan Pritsiolas]

[Text] Frank Rubino, defense attorney for deposed General Manuel Antonio Noriega, sent a letter to President Guillermo Endara asking for the chief executive's cooperation in facilitating the interrogation of several former military officers. They are reportedly to be witnesses in the ongoing trial of Noriega, former Panamanian strongman, on charges of drug trafficking in Miami.

EL PANAMA AMERICA received that information from an official Panamanian source who said that Rubino is interested in the testimony of Nivaldo Madrinar, former director of the National Department of Investigations; former Major Lucinio Miranda; and Colonel Marcos Justine, former chief of staff of the Panama Defense Forces. They all are in prison in Panama.

The request from Noriega's defense team was discussed at a meeting held by President Endara, Foreign Minister Julio Linares, and Attorney General Rogelio Cruz. The government decided not to respond.

According to the source, the Panamanian position is to wait for Judge William Hoeveler to approve the petition and for the U.S. Government to subsequently present the request through diplomatic channels. In such a case, the Panamanian reply would be subject to reciprocity from Washington with respect to future requests from Panama, the source added.

The problem with which the Noriega defense team is faced would have been resolved if the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) signed by the United States and Panama in 1990 were already in effect. The MLAT was presented to the U.S. Congress for ratification in October, 1991, but is still being debated.

Gen. Noriega's trial for drug trafficking is scheduled to resume 27 January.

Party Leaders Oppose Constituent Assembly

PA0601183792 Panama City EL PANAMA AMERICA in Spanish 5 Jan 92 p 1A

[Report by Juan Pritsiolas]

[Text] Political party leaders oppose calling for a constituent assembly. Others, however, favor this alternative that was proposed recently by Comptroller General Ruben Dario Carles. For years Carlos Ivan Zuniga, now University of Panama rector, has favored this alternative.

Ivan Romero, vice president of the Christian Democratic Party, said that those who favor this formula are "plotting" against democracy and that Carles seeks to "do away with" the Legislative Assembly and weaken, "and even replace," President Guillermo Endara. He added that the constituent assembly is pushed also by aspiring legislators who did not have the courage to participate in a drive against Manuel Antonio Noriega, but who now want "to take advantage of the situation." Carles, Romero said, feels "frustrated" because he has been unable to manipulate the Assembly just as he manipulates the president.

Ernesto Perez Balladares, secretary general of the Democratic Revolutionary Party, said that his party would only support a constituent assembly that "reorganizes" all of the government branches, "from the president down." Perez, a former minister of the Torrijos government, also said: "We do not believe in a partial constituent assembly. We favor the permanence of the constitutional order."

Antonio Dominguez, immigration director and member of the Arnulfista Party, said that this idea of a constituent assembly is "mental masturbation" of people who have their head in the clouds instead of working for Panama. According to Dominguez, Endara should "lash out" at the lazy ones, starting with those who think of a constituent assembly.

Hernan Delgado, Endara's partner and president of the Union of Lawyers, declined to discuss the subject and only said that his opinion was different from that of the government. Delgado is thought to back the opinion of the National Bar Association [CNA] on the constituent assembly.

Italo Antinori, president of the CNA's constitutional commission, recalled that the fourth CNA congress agreed to back a constituent assembly that would be parallel to the Legislative Assembly. Antinori said that the Constituent Assembly delegates should be elected by the people and that their only function should be to draft a new constitution. He denied the possibility of the president dissolving the Legislative Assembly once the constituent assembly is installed. He added that the president does not have this power.

Dr. Carlos Lopez Guevara, president of one of the Labor Party [PALA] factions, said he "completely opposes" the idea of a constituent assembly because "it is unnecessary and out of the juridical order." He said that a constituent assembly is used in times of crisis, but that Panama is in the midst of a democratization process. According to Lopez, Endara should designate a commission that would outline a draft constitution within a year. The draft would be presented to the Legislative Assembly in 1994.

Luis Guillermo Casco Arias, secretary general of the Nationalist Liberal Republican Movement, said that his party "has not even considered" a constituent assembly and that it is contradictory to discuss this proposal at a

time when the Legislative Assembly debates constitutional amendments. According to Arias, Comptroller Carles "has the right to express his own opinion (on the constituent assembly) because he usually has his views on other matters."

Dr. Cesar Quintero, until recently magistrate of the Supreme Court, said that a constituent assembly, be it absolute or partial, would represent "a break in the constitutional order." He said that such a constituent assembly depends on the president, the only person who could convene it. He said it would be best to wait for the results of the referendum in which the people will ratify or reject the Assembly's amendments to the Constitution. If a majority of the people back the amendments, the movement for the constituent assembly is not justified. If the people reject the amendments, however, it would be proper to convene a constituent assembly, he said. Finally, he said that he would rather have a constituent assembly parallel to the Legislative Assembly and with limited functions, because a constituent assembly with absolute powers might lead to a "coup."

Executive Branch Endorses Three New Laws

PA0401161592 Panama City CRITICA LIBRE in Spanish 31 Dec 91 p 20

[Text] The Executive Branch duly endorsed three laws that were approved during the current legislative period.

Law No. 30 of 26 December 1991 "Modifying Decree Law No. 14 of 27 August 1954, on the Social Security Trust Fund [CSS] bylaws" was presented to the parliament by Health Minister Guillermo Rolla Pimentel. Changes to the CSS include economic and administrative matters. According to Legislator Gloria Moreno de Lopez, president of the legislative health commission, these changes will ensure the institution's economic resources up to the year 2020.

The Executive Branch also endorsed Law No. 28 of 23 December 1991 "Approving the International Textile Trade Treaty passed in Geneva on 20 December 1973," which was presented to the plenary by Deputy Foreign Minister Jose Raul Mulino. The agreement's basic objectives are to expand trade, reduce obstacles to trade, and gradually open the international trade of textile products. This agreement regulates the import tariffs on textiles and protects Panama's textile export quota.

The third law endorsed by President Guillermo Endara Galimany was Law No. 29 of 23 December 1991, "Approving the Inter-American Extradition Convention passed in Caracas, Venezuela on 25 February 1991," which was presented to the Panamanian Parliament by Foreign Minister Julio Linares. The extradition agreement has 34 articles to improve international cooperation on matters of criminal justice. It clearly establishes the crimes that merit extradition and stipulates extradition procedures.

Church Spokesman Clarifies Position on Amnesty

PA0601041392 Panama City LA ESTRELLA DE PANAMA in Spanish 4 Jan 92 pp a-1, a-2

[Article by Hermes Sucre Serrano]

[Text] Monsignor Jose Luis Lacunza, spokesman for the Archbishopric of Panama, on 2 January pointed out that, before granting amnesty for crimes committed during the dictatorship, pending cases must be expedited in the courts to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.

At a news conference at the Metropolitan Curia, Lacunza said that, two years after the dictatorship, the slow process of justice, legal procedures and appeals, and the accumulation of cases have prevented the trial of any of those linked to the previous regime.

He added that amnesty is a legal instrument that is addressed in our Constitution. If it has contributed to overcoming profound national divisions in other countries, it could well be applied in Panama for the sake of reconciliation.

"We must define the meaning of political crime and political prisoner, because it is absolutely contradictory to request amnesty for prisoners who committed political crimes. There should be no political prisoners in a legal state, otherwise, the most basic human rights would be violated," the church leader said.

Also present at the news conference were Dr. Stanley Muschett, rector of the Santa Maria la Antigua University and member of the Peace and Reconciliation Commission; and Luis Alberto Diaz, president of the Association of Catholic Journalists and director of the newspaper PANORAMA CATOLICO.

Msgr. Lacunza said that attention has been called on several opportunities and before various institutions to the need to expedite judicial procedures by appointing judges and special prosecutors to deal with and solve the most important cases and meet the Panamanian people's clamor for justice.

Lacunza pointed out that a report on 26 December in the newspaper LA PRENSA on an interview with Msgr. Marcos G. McGrath omitted certain portions and gave the impression that the archbishop recommends amnesty for all prisoners linked to the military regime. He added that the article refers to an alleged crime committed by the church in Panama: keeping silence in the face of "the soldiers' atrocities." That article overlooks the actions and stands adopted by the Panamanian church in 1968, 1971, 1974, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1983, and from 1985 onward.

"We wish to point out that the errors of quoting out of context and of only excerpting statements while ignoring official documents or sources are not in keeping with the

seriousness that should characterize Panamanian journalism, and thus, also decrease the possibility of establishing the informed, respectful, and positive dialogue that Panama needs so much," Lacunza added.

He said that the two editorials and a cartoon published by LA PRENSA on 30 and 31 December, respectively, "raised to the level of the editor's office the commission of errors of misinformation and omission that we pointed out from the 26 December article. The situation is significantly worsened by the angry and disrespectful tone that is evident in certain columns."

"We suggest in general, and not only with regard to the church, that there be more concern and respect for the truth and for the people and institutions that comprise the Panamanian community," he said.

Contract Authorizes Chinese To Certify Sailors

PA0301212192 Panama City EL PANAMA AMERICA in Spanish 29 Dec 91 p 8D

[Article by Juan Pritsiolas]

[Text] The Panamanian Government and a Chinese enterprise have signed a contract authorizing that enterprise to issue and verify qualification certificates to Chinese officers and sailors working on ships of the National Merchant Fleet of Panama.

The cabinet issued a resolution authorizing the General Consular and Ships Directorate to sign a contract with the China Marine Services Corporation that the government describes as "the only one" that can issue documents in the region.

The offices for receiving, issuing, and verifying qualification certificates to Chinese personnel of the Panamanian Merchant Fleet will be in Beijing, PRC.

The cabinet based its decision on the fact that it is very expensive for Chinese officers and sailors to travel to other regions to secure these certificates.

The Panamanian Government also uses the services of a French company, the Bureau Veritas, to issue qualification certificates to sailors from other countries.

Argentina

Foreign Ministry Issues Communique on Falklands

PY0601181892 Buenos Aires Radio Nacional Network in Spanish 1500 GMT 6 Jan 92

[Text] The Foreign Ministry has expressed the Argentine Government's desire to persevere in its demand to obtain recognition of our sovereign rights over the Malvinas Islands and to achieve that objective by the peaceful means provided for in the UN Charter.

A little past noon, the Foreign Ministry released a communique on President Carlos Menem's remarks on possible solutions to the dispute with Great Britain over sovereignty of the Malvinas, South Georgia, and South Sandwich Islands.

Diplomatic Relations Established With Ukraine

PY0701002492 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS in Spanish 2130 GMT 6 Jan 92

[Text] Buenos Aires, 6 Jan (NA)—It was officially reported here that the permanent Argentine and Ukrainian delegations to the United Nations on 6 January signed a "protocol to establish diplomatic relations" between the two Republics.

The Foreign Ministry reported in a brief communique that the agreement was signed in New York by the chiefs [words indistinct].

For Argentina, the protocol was signed by [words indistinct].

Government To Support GATT Director's Proposal

PY0601210292 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish 1929 GMT 5 Jan 92

[Text] Buenos Aires, 5 Jan (TELAM)—Sources from the Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries Secretariat (SAGYP) have reported that Argentina will support, perhaps with some variations, the proposal submitted by GATT Director General Arthur Dunkel that predicts a 36-percent reduction in subsidies between 1993 and 1999.

Officials from the Foreign Ministry, SAGYP, and the Industry and Commerce Secretariat, together with production representatives, will meet again on 7 January to discuss the Dunkel proposal, a lengthy work of 500 pages, and to decide what the country's position will be at the 13 January meeting in Brussels.

The Dunkel proposal includes the conversion of tariffs of all nontariff barriers and the progressive reduction of subsidies by 36 percent, but between 1993 and 1999, while the period from 1986 through 1988 will be used as a base.

Moreover, the document guarantees a minimum access of 3 percent for products currently affected by obstacles to reaching international markets.

Official sources have stated that although that position is different from the position maintained by the Cairns Group (countries that do not subsidize their exports), in that it demands the total elimination of subsidies by the year 2000, the proposal improves the current situation somewhat.

The explanation given is that in this manner the growing tendencies of subsidies imposed by developed countries on their producers will be reversed.

Argentina's stand at the GATT, a forum comprising 108 countries, probably will be released toward the end of the week, although a tendency favorable to the aforementioned proposal has been predicted, perhaps with some variations.

Menem, Minister on Dismantling Welfare System

PY0501225492 Buenos Aires BUENOS AIRES HERALD in English 4 Jan 92 p 11

[Text] (NA-DYN)—Health Minister Julio Cesar Araoz yesterday confirmed he would soon be handing President Carlos Menem a draft law to dismantle the current social welfare fund system, allowing workers to become affiliated to their fund of choice. However he opposed the idea of eliminating PAMI [Comprehensive Medical Assistance Plan] pensioners's fund and ANSSAL [National Health Insurance Administration] national health administration, as promoted by other government officials.

President Menem himself forecast yesterday that both PAMI and ANSSAL would "very likely disappear" as part of the sweeping social welfare reform. The President explained that the government would revamp the system in order to "offer social welfare fund members better health coverage." He also urged pensioners to "have faith and keep up their spirits," because "the few pesos they get today are stable currency, not printed paper which loses value." "Retired workers now earn a minimum of 150 dollars per month while pensions didn't go over 20 dollars" in the last months of the previous Radical government, boasted Menem.

Araoz is slated to submit his ministry's proposal to Menem within 15 days. The idea is based on a report by the Mediterranean Foundation run by Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo.

The President will then pick one of several alternatives, including the original social security and welfare fund reform project drafted by the Latin American Economic Research Foundation (FIEL) and others presented by banks and independent organizations.

Araoz explained that the Health Ministry was aiming to upgrade health care services through free competition and also to reduce evasion, "at a time when the social welfare fund system is bankrupt." Regarding pensioners, he made very clear his view that "a social welfare fund like PAMI cannot be dissolved."

Deputy Economy Minister Carlos Sanchez, for his part, denied the Economy Ministry had any specific plan to overhaul the social welfare funds. But he admitted it had

"co-operated in the past with the Social Action Ministry, advising it on financial aspects." The initiative would allow some 15 million workers in the private and public sectors to decide whether their monthly contributions go to one of several social welfare funds or to an independent health care service. They would then pick one from either category. Members will also be entitled to change funds every six months if not satisfied with the services provided.

Employers' and workers' contributions will be collected by the unified social security system, which will then distribute the money to the corresponding funds at 22.50 dollars per member.

According to Menem, social welfare and social security funds have a deficit of seven billion dollars. Defending the proposed reform, he stressed that "80 percent of the funds collected to date by those funds go towards maintaining the administrative apparatus and only 20 percent for specific welfare functions."

"It's very likely PAMI and ANSSAL will disappear to give affiliated members a better system," he added.

Meanwhile, several politicians spoke out against the proposed reform, including former Radical health minister Aldo Neri and Deputies Lorenzo Pepe (Justicialist) and Juan Carlos Sabio (Pensioners White Party).

Brazil

BNDES Regulates Loans to Foreign Enterprises

PY0401153892 Brasilia Radio Nacional da Amazonia Network in Portuguese 0900 GMT 4 Jan 92

[Text] The National Bank for Economic and Social Development [BNDES] has approved regulations on granting loans to foreign enterprises with resources obtained from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank [IDB]. Regulations for granting loans to foreign enterprises, including those headquartered in Brazil that are managed by private individuals or corporations abroad, have been approved by the BNDES.

The resources will be those obtained from foreign credit lines granted in 1991 by the World Bank and the IDB, which currently amount to approximately $330 million.

Preference will be given to projects designed to establish or expand the capacity of industrial plants of proven competitiveness, investments in infrastructure projects and in the agriculture and livestock field, projects designed to preserve the environment, and purchases of imported equipment by national industries.

By the end of the first quarter of the year, after the Brazilian foreign debt problem has been settled with the IMF and the Paris Club, the BNDES management hopes to begin negotiations to obtain new credit lines from Eximbank in Japan, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the IDB for the same purpose.

Amendment to Export Processing Zone Law Approved

PY0701122692 Brasilia Radio Nacional da Amazonia Network in Portuguese 0900 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Excerpt] Both Brazilian and foreign enterprises can now be authorized to set up Export Processing Zones [ZPE].

President Fernando Collor has approved the amendment to the law regulating the establishment of ZPE's.

The government has already authorized the establishment of 14 ZPE's that should become operational within the next two years. [passage omitted]

Chile

Weapons Shipment to Croatia Believed Third

PY0601122492 Santiago Television Nacional de Chile Network in Spanish 2330 GMT 5 Jan 92

[Excerpts] The shipment of weapons to Croatia that is currently being investigated by Special Judge Hernan Correa de la Cerda is believed to be the third such illegal shipment from Chile.

This past Sunday [as heard] the judge did not show up at his office at the 18th Criminal Court, but yesterday he decided to submit to a trial Ramon Perez Orellano, an Army civilian employee, for forging public documents.

According to judicial sources, the investigations have already confirmed that this was the third illegal shipment of weapons from Chile. The investigations now seeks to find those responsible for those illegal shipments which were sent from Santiago, from Iquique, and from Antofagasta. [passage omitted]

Within the next few hours, lawyer Hugo Rivera will assume Perez Orellano's defense, and only accompanied by the lawyer will his wife be able to visit him in jail. The judge also issued an arrest warrant for a French citizen, the representative of the purchasing company (Id Marciale), who is wanted by the investigations police. The judge order that the French citizen may not leave the country.

Weapons Exports Resumed

PY0601202092 Santiago Radio Chilena Network in Spanish 1600 GMT 6 Jan 92

[Text] Chamber of Deputies President Jose Antonio Viera-Gallo has reported that arms exports were resumed four or five days ago. He said this after a meeting that also was attended by the interior minister, the minister secretary of government, defense minister, the secretary general of the presidency, and the presidents of the Coalition of Parties congressional blocs.

The possibility of creating a congressional commission to investigate the arms smuggling was analyzed during the meeting. A decision in this respect will be made in

the next few hours. Viera-Gallo referred to the Defense Ministry's responsibility in the case of fraudulent arms exports to Croatia.

[Begin recording] There is no doubt that when arms are exported and a series of steps are taken, they have to be made in keeping with the laws, and the Defense Ministry authorized the export. What happens is that the Defense Ministry was misinformed because what was designed for Sri Lanka was finally sent to Budapest. It is a matter that does not fall under the minister's responsibility. [end recording]

Viera-Gallo also has reiterated his position on the need to regulate all the process on arms exports and to review the article on the Law on Arms Control. He also said that the new decree ordering the creation of a committee to deal with the matter should be accompanied by a congressional report on each of the shipments so that the political forces are aware of the delicate matters that affect Chilean foreign policy. As for his position on the creation of an investigative commission, Viera-Gallo said that he supports the need to clarify the matter, adding that there were many channels to do so.

Rojas Not Aware of Shipments

PY0701012492 Santiago Radio Cooperativa Network in Spanish 2200 GMT 6 Jan 92

[Text] Defense Minister Patricio Rojas has said he was not aware of any new arms shipment to other countries and reiterated that the Comptroller's Office continues to investigate the illegal arms shipment to Europe. The minister was sparing in words but admitted that the inquiry continues at the political and ministerial level to find out the true implications of the negotiations to send arms to Sri Lanka and then divert them from Santiago Airport to Croatia. Minister Rojas made his remarks at the end of a visit to the Women's Service Office [Sernam], where he greeted Sernam Director Soledad Alvear and Sernam personnel on the occasion of the service's first anniversary.

Party Seeks CIA's Knowledge of Arms Sales

PY0601185492 Santiago Radio Chilena Network in Spanish 1600 GMT 6 Jan 92

[Report by Rosa Alcallaga]

[Text] The Independent Democratic Union [UDI] deputy bloc will request in Congress tomorrow that Defense Minister Patricio Rojas submit details on why the CIA was aware of the Chilean arms sale, and what information that organization submitted to Chilean authorities.

Andres Chadwick, head of the UDI bloc in the Chamber of Deputies, has stated that what really occurred is that there was an attempt to make Chile discontinue its weapons supply to the markets.

The UDI wants to know the links existing between the Chilean Government and the CIA, and that the mechanisms used to obtain that information be verified. Chadwick said that they do not oppose creating a Chamber of Deputies investigative committee to deal with the illegal weapons sale, but that precedence should be given to other investigations such as those conducted by the courts, the Army, the Comptroller's Office, and the Defense Ministry itself.

The UDI's approval of the creation of a commission will depend on three elements: the effectiveness of the investigation, the government's attitude with respect to the responsibility of civilian employees, including the Defense Minister himself and others in this illegal trafficking, and if the UDI is satisfied with the defense minister's response regarding the CIA's role. National Renewal Party [RN] Deputy Baldo Prokurica, in turn, said that he agreed with the need to carry out a thorough investigation as requested by the UDI, but he said that he did not have more information about it.

RN First Vice Chairman Miguel Otero said the RN does not voice an opinion on things about which the party is not aware, that it would be risky, and it would be an opportunity to take political advantage of something that could have serious repercussions for Chile's interest. He said that one must act very cautiously in something that can damage the country's international image.

Foreign Minister Denies Pressure in Honecker Case

PY0701015292 Santiago Radio Cooperativa Network in Spanish 2200 GMT 6 Jan 92

[Text] Foreign Minister Enrique Silva Cimma denied there were any foreign pressures in the case of Erich Honecker, who is a guest at the Chilean Embassy in Moscow. Silva Cimma had lunch with President Patricio Aylwin to analyze developments in the former Soviet Union, the reorganization of the Foreign Ministry, and the Honecker case, among other things.

[Begin Silva Cimma recording] We also analyzed the Honecker case. The situation at the embassy in Moscow is calm; we do not have anything to report; everything is in order. We are in no hurry to make any decision on the matter. [end recording]

Silva Cimma said there are no deadlines or any urgency to solving the problem. The minister said he did not have any news indicating that Honecker is sick, even though recognizing that the former president is being treated by a doctor. Silva Cimma said he was optimistic that a solution would be found soon. Asked about Ambassador Clodomiro Almeyda's return to Moscow, Silva Cimma said:

[Begin recording] [words indistinct] He will probably be in Moscow in approximately a week. [end recording]

Regarding remarks by the German justice minister, Silva Cimma said that most of what was quoted did not come

from the justice minister. Asked if there was any German pressures in the case, Silva Cimma said:

[Begin recording] Not at all. I must confess that there has not been even a minimum of pressure. [end recording]

Regarding the drop in the number of Argentine tourists who visit Chile, Silva Cimma said the private sector and not the government was to blame. He added that the private sector did not embark on a timely and adequate promotion. Silva Cimma also blamed excessive price increases along the coastal areas for the drop in tourism.

Limit Put on Number of Ships in Valparaiso Port

PY0601152292 Santiago Television Nacional de Chile Network in Spanish 2330 GMT 5 Jan 92

[Excerpt] As of tomorrow, 6 January, a maximum of five Russian merchant ships at a time will be allowed to dock at the port of Valparaiso. The measure has been adopted because lately several Russian ships have been in Chilean waters without engaging in any commercial activities. Crew members of the ships have expressed their concern over the current economic situation in the former Soviet Union.

It has recently been common to see Russian ships docked for weeks at a time in the port of Valparaiso. The ships no longer go to the main Peruvian port of Callao for maintenance for fear of cholera and up to 18 Russian factory ships have been anchored at Valparaiso at a time.

The maritime governing body decided a few days ago that as of 6 January a maximum of five merchant ships per country will be allowed at a time in the port.

[Begin unidentified official recording] It is for security and operational reasons. The movement of ships in the port increases a lot at this time of the year because of the movement of fruit. [end recording]

Russian factory ships have respected the resolution and left the port. Only six ships were seen today at Valparaiso. One of them, a fishing vessel that left the Russian port of Leningrad four months ago, was taking on fuel. [passage omitted]

Colombia

First Elected Governors Take Office

PA0401164992 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1726 GMT 2 Jan 91

[Text] Santa Fe de Bogota, 2 Jan (EFE)—Beginning a new era of participatory democracy in Colombia, 27 departmental governors, elected for the first time by the people, were inaugurated on 2 January. The new heads of 27 of the 32 regional governments took office during ceremonies held in their respective capitals. They will serve a three-year term. The five other departments will choose their governors in elections in 1994.

President Cesar Gaviria stated that with the inauguration of new governors the people take control of their own destiny.

In a message to the governors, Gaviria described as "historic" their inaugurations "within the process of renewal and change to which Colombians are committed in building a broad and participatory democracy." Gaviria offered the governors cooperation from the central government and said that with this election "the participation of the people grows and the estrangement between those who make decisions and those who comply with them disappears."

With the inauguration of the governors, the country in 1992 is entering a political decentralization process after decades of centralism that in some ways hampered growth in the departments. Previously the governors were appointed by the president. But the new Constitution, enacted on 5 July 1991, established that governors are to be chosen by direct balloting.

The elections were held last October, along with the congressional elections. Their results favored the (ruling) Liberal Party, which won 17 governorships. The conservatives won six, and coalitions of different groups won four.

According to the articles of the new Constitution pertaining to the departmental system, the president may dismiss governors "in cases specifically mentioned by a law to be issued by the Congress." In addition, governors may dismiss the mayors in their departments and consult with the people to decide matters dealing with their respective regions.

A governor cannot run for president unless he resigns one year before the corresponding election. The citizens who elected him to office are entitled to demand that he comply with the platform he presented during his registration and defended during the campaign, and to request his resignation.

Government Minister Humberto de la Calle recalled that the Gaviria administration submitted a bill at the Chamber of Representatives to regulate some aspects that were not addressed by the drafters of the Constitution. The bill deals with establishing requirements for the next governors, the acts that may disqualify a candidate from running, and limitations on the officials.

Following is a list of the governors inaugurated on 2 January:
Antioquia: Juan Gomez Martinez (Conservative)
Arauca: Alfredo Colmenares (Liberal)
Atlantico: Gustavo Bell Lemus (Coalition)
Bolivar: Carlos Mendivil (Liberal)
Boyaca: Alfonso Salamanca (Liberal)
Caldas: Pilar Villegas de Hoyos (Conservative)
Cauca: Temistocles Ortega (Liberal)
Caqueta: Gabriel Sandoval (Liberal)
Casanare: Oscar Leonidas Wilches (Liberal)
Cundinmarca: Manuel Infante (Liberal)
Cesar: Lucas Gnecco (Liberal)

Cordoba: Jorge Elias Manzur (Liberal)
Choco: Antonio Heraclito Maya Copete (Liberal)
Guajira: Jorge Ballesteros (Liberal)
Huila: Julio Enrique Ortiz (Liberal)
Magdalena: Miguel Pinedo (Liberal)
Meta: Omar Baquero Soler (Liberal)
Narino: Alvaro Zarama (Conservative)
Norte de Santander: Alvaro Salgar (Conservative)
Putumayo: Segundo Salvador Lasso (Conservative)
Quindio: Mario Gomez Ramirez (Coalition)
Risaralda: Roberto Galves (Liberal)
San Andres: Simon Gonzalez (Coalition)
Santander: Juan Carlos Duarte (Liberal)
Sucre: Edgar Martinez (Liberal)
Tolima: Ramiro Lozano (Coalition)
Valle del Cauca: Carlos Holguin (Conservative)

Generals Warn of Possible Guerrilla Rearmament

PA0601163992 Santa Fe de Bogota Emisoras Caracol in Spanish 1200 GMT 6 Jan 91

[Text] General Manuel Alberto Murillo Gonzalez stated that the Colombian Armed Forces has concrete evidence that guerrillas are attempting to introduce weapons to various regions of the country to build up their respective battlefronts.

Gen. Murillo Gonzalez pointed out that the evidence is very clear. He added: After every encounter with the subversives authorities have discovered various types of weapons the subversives have received from foreign sources. He continued by pointing out: I cannot say with complete certainty that the arrival of an arms shipment is imminent, but I can say that the subversives are rearming once again.

Gen. Murillo Gonzalez' statements agree with those made by Gen. Eddie Alberto Payares, commander of the 4th Army Division, concerning arms shipments the guerrillas are expecting in order to rearm.

According to Gen. Payares, only the guerrilla groups can say whether they are conducting themselves with sincerity and openness during the peace dialogue with the government. He said: Only they know whether or not they are sincere.

Traffickers Offer Heroin on International Market

PA0201190692 Santa Fe de Bogota Emisoras Caracol Network in Spanish 1200 GMT 31 Dec 91

[Text] Colombian drug traffickers have started to offer heroin on the international markets, General Rozo Julio Serrano Cadena, antinarcotics police director, has asserted. The general indicated that because the first heroin processing laboratories have been found in Colombia, it is presumed that basic latex for heroin is already being processed in the country. These processing laboratories were located in Huila and Tolima Departments.

The report that the narcotics police director delivered to National Police Director General Gomez Padilla states that the gangs controlling the cocaine trade are also trafficking, marketing, and processing heroin and morphine. General Serrano Cadena said substituting poppy for coca is obvious. The peasants are actively participating in this new problem.

Paraguay

Revenue Official Reports on New Tax System

PY0301162292 Asuncion ABC COLOR in Spanish 3 Jan 92 p 11

[Interview with Revenue Bureau Under Secretary Carlos Sosa Jovellanos by unidentified ABC COLOR correspondent; date and place not given]

[Text] [ABC COLOR] Has the new tax system been implemented?

[Sosa] The new tax system has been approved by Congress and will now be promulgated by the executive branch, which, I believe, will do so within the next few days.

[ABC COLOR] Therefore, implementation of the new law depends on its promulgation?

[Sosa] The date of implementation is 1 January 1992. The law has a specific article that states that the law goes into effect on 1 January 1991. The law also contains an article empowering the executive branch—in this case, the Finance Ministry—to postpone the abrogation of some previous taxes and gradually to implement the new taxes.

[ABC COLOR] To sum up, what taxes have been in force since 1 January?

[Sosa] The real estate tax, income tax, and the tax on the internal cattle trade are now in force. Implementation of the VAT [value-added tax], the selected goods tax, and the tax on records and documents has been postponed for the time being.

[ABC COLOR] Consequently, the tax on the export of agricultural products contained in the section pertaining to the tax on records and documents has also been postponed?

[Sosa] I have been given to understand that this tax will be implemented gradually. I believe the executive branch will implement the tax when the need arises. That will be decided by the economic team, which is the organization that must decide what rate will be applied to the agroindustrial sector with respect to the rate that is applied to grain exporters. Once the economic team decides on that, it will be known whether that 12 percent rate will be implemented and what other measures are going to be adopted, taking into account that the 12 percent rate is not an extreme because the executive branch can use a lower percentage.

[ABC COLOR] If the real estate tax under the new system has already been implemented, how does the taxpayer go about paying it; has there been any change or is the procedure the same?

[Sosa] The procedure is the same. The structure for paying the real estate tax remains the same, the system is the same, and payment is made at the same cashier windows. Some improvements have been made to the old structure, but the procedure is the same.

[ABC COLOR] Is the procedure the same for income tax?

[Sosa] Yes, the procedure is the same one.

[ABC COLOR] The taxpayer is not going to run into any surprises when he goes to pay?

[Sosa] No. I would like to say, however, that the taxpayer is going to run into nice surprises during the course of the year, especially when his 1992 taxes are being calculated, because he will be able to deduct more, particularly if the deductions directly pertain to profits, something that was very limited in the past. In general, however, the same structure is being maintained with certain differences such as the fact that the categories have been abrogated and, logically, new forms have to be printed.

[ABC COLOR] Regarding the old structure, what taxes remain in force?

[Sosa] The sales tax, services tax, and stamp tax (Law 1003), which will disappear when the VAT is implemented. Those taxes will be in force until June, and the VAT and its complementary taxes will presumably be implemented in July.

[ABC COLOR] The new law establishes its publication in all the newspapers as a prerequisite for implementation.

[Sosa] It is going to be published. Undoubtedly, it will be published after it has been implemented because the law itself establishes that it must be implemented on 1 January 1992. It will be published afterward because there was no time to publish it beforehand.

[ABC COLOR] Do you guarantee that the taxpayer will not run into any setbacks when he goes to pay his real estate tax...

[Sosa] He will not run into any difficulties. He can pay directly.

Constituent Assembly Media Ban Causes Unease

PY0601143292 Asuncion ABC COLOR in Spanish 5 Jan 92 P 1

[Text] The controversial agreement among members of the Drafting Committee of the National Constituent Assembly to ban the media from attending debates by the advisory committees has caused unease among political circles. While Constituent Assembly President Oscar Facundo Insfran yesterday fully justified the decision to keep information from the media, only a few days after upholding the value of a "free and capable media in a democratic system" (inaugural speech on 30 December 1991), Emilio Camacho, head of the independent movement Constitution For All (CPT), emphasized that the CPT believes that the media should attend all the plenary session of the Constituent Assembly and those of its respective committees.

Colorado Party Deputy Sandino Gill Oporto opposes the agreement, saying that "it makes no sense to ban the media from attending the sessions." Jose Felix Fernandez Estigarribia, who heads the PLRA [Authentic Radical Liberal Party] delegation in the Constituent Assembly, insulted an ABC COLOR reporter and then emphatically stated: "We have had no say in the matter."

Executive Branch Decrees Promotion of Officers

PY0201211992 Asuncion ABC COLOR in Spanish 2 Jan 92 p 11

[Summary] Through Decree No. 12093, the executive branch has promoted the following officers to the rank of brigadier general: Daniel Guzman Idoyaga Mendoza, Federico Magno Candia Flores, Osvaldo Cruz Acevedo Gamon, Jose Felix Ramon Pavon Gonzalez, Cesar Rafael Cramer Espinola, Mauricio Bartolome Diaz Delmas, Ramon Antonio Garcete, Jorge Mendoza Ghaete, Hector Adriano Ocampos Diaz, Roosewelt Cesar Benitez Molinas, Juan Evaristo Gonzalez Maldonado, Mario Barreto Aguero, and Lorenzo Morel. Carlos Guillermo Lopez Moreira has been promoted to the rank of rear admiral.

The following division generals are hereby retired: Juan de Dios Garbet, Juan Manuel Campos Guillen, and Victor Antonio Aguilera Torres. The following brigadier generals are also retired: Ricardo Bogado Silva, Eduardo Allende, Solano Ignacio Gamarra, Luis Alberto Laguardia Roa, Pablo Feschenko, Ruben Adolfo Suarez, Dionisio Cabello Amarilla, Eduardo Ramon Sosa, Ramon Rosa Rodriguez Maldonado, Oscar Arcadio Saucedo Rojas, and Victor Domiciano Olmedo de Felice.

President Andres Rodriguez has also signed Decree No. 12092 by which 43 lieutenant colonels were promoted to the rank of colonel: Victor Anibal Lopez Gimenez, Optaciano Martinez Montiel, Mamoru Fulgencio Hashimoto Ikeshita, Pablo Alcibiades Maldonado Guerrero, Higinio Cesar Moreira Enciso, Eugenio Secundino Morel Garay, Jose Concepcion Gonzalez Ovelar, Juan Antonio Pozzo Moreno, Abel Omar Guerin Velazco, Buenaventura Colman Mendoza, Expedito Adriano Garrigoza Vera, Silvestre Aquiles Vega Bogado, Eligio Lezcano Rios, Francisco Zarza Benitez, Luis Dario Chamorro Talavera, Vicente Wenceslado Ortiz, Blas Antonio Ramirez Valenzano, Carlos Adan Baruja Arbues, Nelson Fulgencio Florentin Olmedo, Indalecio Pascual Dominguez Santacruz, Francisco Marcelo Mendieta Brosssi, Luis Carlos Duarte Nunez, Maximino Arguello Britez, Ramon Garcete Espinola, Jorge Recalde Davalos, Francisco Ramon Ledesma Samudio, Armando Roux Reineger, Andres Baez, Eusebio Casco Ovelar, Francisco Humberto Benitez Benitez, Carlos Antonio Godoy Ozuna, Mario Bogado Pinanez, Claudio Nimio Pereira Zarza, Heriberto Ramon Sanchez Sosa,

Gregorio Moral Ortega, Wilfrido Rafael Navarro Valdez, Reinerio Martinez Duarte, Francisco Mauro Ferreira Vera, Blasia Bueno Gomez, Gladys Presentacion Martinez de Lezcano, Elina Estela Larrosa de Luraschi, Joaquin Guadalupe Lima Gimenez, and Justo Abdon Urbieta Galeano.

In the Navy, the following were promoted to the rank of Navy captain: Jose Ernesto Francou Caballero, Baltazar Angel Romero Blanco, Adriano Britez Campuzano, Isabelino Americo Guerrero Caceres, Ferminiano Ozuna Valenzuela, Juan Angel Torres Mello, and Filomena Ignacia Carreras Leon.

Within the police force, the executive branch also promulgated the promotion of 39 police officials to the rank of inspector general: Francisco Erwin Bergmann Nickel, Rodolfo Acuna Figueredo, Francisco Ramon Perez Arias, Ramon Caballero Zavala, Arnaldo Martinez Vera, and Bernardo Nunez Rojas. The following were promoted to the rank of sub inspector: Marciano Torres Ibarra, Isidro Dario Rumich, and Osvaldo Sanabria.

A total of 39 police officers were retired, among them Sub Inspector Eusebio Monzon Ramirez, the former Congress security guard chief who became famous last year for reporting several of his colleagues as being torturers during the previous regime. The others are: Bernardino Caballero, Celso Miguel Nunez Ortega, Juan Angel Viana Ayala, Sergio Rodriguez Vera, Cesar Aladino Morales Reichert, Andres Nunez Perez, Bienvenido Ismael Arevalo, Eulalia Vera de Rojas, Manuel Colman U., Catalina Medina de Ibarrola, Rodolfo Perez Osorio, Oscar Rufino Torres Gomez, Carlos Domingo Cuevas Chavez, Ramon Eustaquio Amarilla A., Ricardo Raul Sosa Ramirez, Osvaldo Pastor Nunez Niz, Victor Cipriano Bogado Vila, Ewaldo Victorino Heinichen Hackmack, Wilfrido Lopez Salinas, Clemente Diaz Espinola, Beatriz Jacquet de Fretes, Felix Ramon Lezcano, Carlos Victorio Pozzi, Amado Said Luque, Atanacio Cano Cardozo, Juan Felix Mongelos Gonzalez, Felino Nicanor Dure Lopez, Lorenzo Ricardo Cerfoglio, Victorino Oviedo, Oscar Antolino Cazo Paredes, Luis Aranda Ortiz, Maria Critina Gamarra Pascottini, Carlos Maximo Alonso Burgos, Jacinto Recalde Gonzalez, Pedro Samudio Moreira, Panfilo Leguizamon, Hugo Bogado Barrios, and Benito Caceres Ferreira.

Roundup of Economic Activities, Statistics

PY0201213792

[Editorial Report] Following are reports on economic activities in Paraguay monitored by Paraguay Bureau on 2 January 1992. Source, date, and time are given in parentheses after each item.

Paraguayan Central Bank President Jose Enrique Paez has said that inflation in December 1991 showed a negative tendency of 0.3 percent. He added that inflation between December 1990 and December 1991 totaled 11.8 percent compared with 44 percent between December 1989 and December 1990. (Asuncion ABC Color in Spanish 2 Jan 92 p 9)

The Paraguayan Central Bank [BCP] has reported a $550 million trade balance deficit at the end of 1991, adding that the deficit during 1990 was $245 million. The BCP also reported that it increased its international reserves by $200 million at the end of 1991. (Asuncion ULTIMA HORA in Spanish 2 Jan 92 p 11)

The Paraguayan Central Bank has loaned more than 850 billion guaranies to the private sector and 206 billion guaranies to the public sector. (Asuncion ULTIMA HORA in Spanish 2 Jan 92 p 21)

According to data supplied by the General Directorate of Customs, exports during 1991 totaled 2,051,855.6 metric tons and were worth $731,233,894.80, which represents a 23.6 decline compared to 1990 exports. (Asuncion ULTIMA HORA in Spanish 2 Jan 92 p 11)

Peru

Foreign Minister on Fujimori Proposals to Ecuador

PY0601204492 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1632 GMT 4 Jan 92

[Text] Lima, 4 Jan (EFE)—Peruvian Foreign Minister Augusto Blacker Miller announced today that President Alberto Fujimori will offer Ecuador 37 development projects for the border zone. The projects involve the highway, energy, and agricultural fields, among others.

Blacker Miller added that international organizations such as the Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE), among others, will participate in the projects. The Peruvian foreign minister also said that during a conversation on 3 January with his Ecuadoran counterpart, Diego Cordobez, they discussed a "message from Pope John Paul II to the two countries urging them to seek peace and understanding." Blacker Miller said that the message "represents a political endorsement to Presidents Alberto Fujimori and Rodrigo Borja."

Fujimori, during the first state visit paid by a Peruvian president to Ecuador, will be in that country between 9-11 January, answering an invitation extended to him by Rodrigo Borja. In addition to the meetings he will hold with his Ecuadoran counterpart, Fujimori will address a "transcendental" message to the Ecuadoran Congress.

In a statement to a Lima radio station, Blacker Miller said the talks the two presidents will hold will refer to the four proposals made by Fujimori last 24 November in a letter addressed to Rodrigo Borja, which are the following: complete demarcation of the two border areas; that Peru and Ecuador seek a greater integration of their border areas; in keeping with point six of the Rio de Janeiro protocol, which established the borders between the two countries in 1942, to promote Ecuadoran navigation along the rivers in the Peruvian Amazon area; and

to create the means to promote friendship and confidence between the armed forces of the two countries.

President Fujimori will take to Ecuador proposals designed to strengthen and increase the aforementioned four proposals, according to the Peruvian foreign minister, who will accompany Fujimori to Ecuador. Blacker Miller said: "We must strengthen our relationship; we can no longer remain confrontational and we must seek common points of view for the well-being of our people."

The foreign minister said that the four points of Fujimori's proposal entail a "comprehensive and all-encompassing proposal," and although the points will not all be carried out at the same time they can already start being discussed, although the first point that refers to the border demarcation will obviously take more time. Blacker Miller admitted, "however, that not everything will be solved on 9 January."

The foreign minister urged the Peruvian media to handle the information regarding the situation between the two countries "with great care and with the utmost transparency." He added that Ecuadoran politicians had acknowledged the Peruvian proposals "positively, although there are different points of view, as in any democratic country," but it is believed that the time has come "to reach a definite solution to this shameful, difficult, and sad issue."

Peru and Ecuador were at war in 1941, and in 1942 signed the Rio de Janeiro Treaty establishing the border between the two countries. That treaty was endorsed by the United States, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil. In Peru's opinion the protocol is perfect and remains unchanged, while Ecuador regards it as void.

Foreign Minister Blacker Miller said the high commands of the Peruvian and Ecuadoran Armed Forces will start holding meetings for the purpose of creating confidence. He added that the meeting scheduled to be held before the presidential meeting was postponed and that it will be held between 15 January and 15 February.

The foreign minister refused to mention how many kilometers of the Peruvian-Ecuadoran borderline remain to be demarcated because the border that might be agreed on, be it straight or curved, may vary in distance. However, he noted that definite landmarks remain to be placed in two sectors.

Council President on Fujimori's Objections

PA0401030192 Lima Radio Programas del Peru Network in Spanish 1800 GMT 2 Jan 92

[Report by Maritza Lopez]

[Text] Alfonso de los Heros, president of the Council of Ministers, has reported that the entire cabinet fully supports President Alberto Fujimori's objections to the 1992 general budget bill approved by the congress. De los Heros said that several articles of the bill are unconstitutional because they violate Article 199. He said that if a proposal is unconstitutional, it is the government's duty to object. Those who think that the executive's actions are confrontational with the legislature are wrong. De los Heros said the cabinet will meet today, presided over by Fujimori. The meeting will discuss the possibility of convening a special round of sessions to debate the 1992 budget. This is an excerpt of De los Heros' remarks:

[Begin recording] [De los Heros] You, as journalists, should try to understand that, unlike what happened in previous governments, no party has a majority in this parliament. Consequently, all democratic mechanisms are at work. In previous governments, decisions were made at higher levels because the governing party held a majority. Things are different now. Hence, we are witnessing democratic alternatives.

[Lopez] Mr. Minister, it has been reported that the cabinet did not support the executive's objections to the budget bill.

[De los Heros] The president's objections do enjoy the cabinet's support. At the Council of Ministers meeting held last year, we decided that the bill had to be examined and, if necessary, rejected. If you read the Constitution and the executive's laws, you will see that it is the president of the republic's right to reject a bill and that such an action does not require approval from the Council of Ministers. Nevertheless, we the ministers, decided that the bill should have been rejected.

[Lopez] Several parliamentarians have said it is clearly a confrontation between the executive and the Congress, encouraged in this particular instance....

[De los Heros, interrupting] The exercise by each branch of the rights that the Constitution has invested on it cannot constitute confrontation. The exercise of those rights is part of democracy. I said a few moments ago that because there is no majority in the Congress, things are handled differently.

[Lopez] Is it good for the country that no government official can make expenditures?

[De los Heros] It is not good for the country if the executive makes them and the state branches make them as well. In addition, the measure will be temporary because the problem will be settled shortly. If you read the executive's objections, you will see how, unlike some media and some parliamentarians say, the bill has been objected to because the Constitution has been violated in several instances. Why? Because the law violates Article 199 of the Constitution, which clearly stipulates that a law dealing with the budget should not include other matters, such as regional affairs and public enterprises.

[Lopez] It is also unconstitutional not to have any law.

[De los Heros] Beg your pardon?

[Lopez] It is also unconstitutional not to have a law.

[De los Heros] Not to have a law is not unconstitutional. If a law is unconstitutional, it has to be rejected. It is a duty of the state.

[Lopez] [Words indistinct]

[De los Heros] I think that could be remedied easily. The Congress meets, studies the executive's remarks, and makes a decision within the normal democratic procedures.

[Lopez] [Words indistinct]

[De los Heros] I guess so.

[Lopez] Will there be a mediator between the executive and the Congress?

[De los Heros] There is no need for a mediator. Those who think that each act conducted in the exercise of the democratic right established by law represents a confrontation are wrong. [end recording]

New Supreme Court President Assumes Office

PA0601031292 Lima Global de Television Network in Spanish 0100 GMT 3 Jan 92

[Excerpt] Luis Adolfo Portugal Rondon, 51, assumed office as the new president of the Supreme Court of Justice on 3 January. He replaces Cesar Fernandez Arce. At his swearing-in ceremony, Portugal Rondon said he will propose modifications to the magistrate's evaluation procedures and will be a staunch defender of legal ethics. [passage omitted]

Roundup of Guerrilla Activities 17-31 Dec

PA0401232792

[Editorial Report] Following are reports on guerrilla activities in Peru compiled from international news agencies and Peruvian radio and television newscasts between 17 and 31 December. Sourceline information is given in parentheses after each item.

Three deaths were reported in Ayacucho between 16 and 17 December. The victims were Agustin Gonzalez, 18, a civil self- defense patrolman from Azangaro, who was killed during a clash on 16 December; photographer Alberto Coronel, who was killed at 0745 on 17 December in Giron Cusco as he traveled from his home to his work place; and Quintin Muchari Ayala, 53, a former administrative supervisor at the Ayacucho Transportation and Communications Ministry, who was killed at 1000 on 17 December. (Lima Radio Programas del Peru Network in Spanish 1800 GMT 17 Dec 91)

The Peruvian Armed Forces Joint Command on 20 December announced that four peasants, including three women, were murdered by terrorists who also burned their homes in a village in Ayacucho Department. The murderers are presumably members of the Shining Path. (Madrid EFE in Spanish 1925 GMT 20 Dec 91)

Police sources reported on 23 December that 10 members of the Civil Militias and two Shining Path rebels died during clashes on 22 December in Ayacucho Department. Approximately 70 guerrillas stormed the town of Panti-Icano, burned all the houses, and stole cattle. (Madrid EFE in Spanish 1815 GMT 23 Dec 91)

Police sources reported on 23 December that nine people died on 22 December, including a child and two youths, as a result of terrorist activities during the past eight days. A presumed Shining Path execution unit killed two youths in cold blood in Luricocha, Ayacucho, for refusing to collaborate with the guerrillas. An 11-year old boy died when he stepped on a mine in Vista Alegre, Ayacucho, presumably left by rebels. (Paris AFP in Spanish 1744 GMT 23 Dec 91)

Authorities confirmed on 26 December that the terrorist offensive launched during the Christmas season resulted in more than 100 deaths, several injuries, and considerable damage. Police reported that on 25 December a police sergeant and a civilian were killed in the capital, while businessman Victor de la Torre was released after being kidnaped on 11 September 1990 by the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). General Jaime Rios, chief of the political military command of San Martin Department, explained that 70 rebels along with 10 soldiers, five policemen and at least 10 civilians were killed in clashes on 22 and 23 December in Juanjui and Soritor. (Paris AFP in Spanish 1914 GMT 26 Dec 91)

A police source has reported that on 29 December an execution unit of the Maoist group Shining Path killed three policemen in an ambush in Comas District, in the northern part of Lima. In addition, the source added that a commander of the Technical Police was seriously injured in an attack registered in San Miguel District, Lima. (Paris AFP in Spanish 0244 GMT 29 Dec 91)

Police sources have reported that on 30 December MRTA activists hurled bombs at public and private entities in different parts of Lima injuring three people and causing material damage. An explosive device was hurled at the headquarters of state-owned airline Aeroperu in Miraflores residential area, southern Lima, sources explained. The sources concluded that another bomb—which did not cause damage—was hurled at a bank agency, also in southern Lima. (Paris AFP in Spanish 0407 GMT 31 Dec 91)